Cyberporn : investigatory and prosecutorial issues relating to child pornography in the New Zealand context by Jefferson, Judith.
JUDITH JEFFERSON 
CYBERPORN: 
INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORIAL 
ISSUES RELATING TO CHILD 
PORNOGRP AHY IN THE NEW ZEALAND 
CONTEXT 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
CYBERSPACE LAW (LAWS 520) 
LAW FACULTY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
2001 
CONTENTS 
I INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... l 
II CHILD PORNOGRAPHY - A WORKING DEFINITION .......... 3 
III THE FILMS, VIDEOS, AND PUBLICATIONS 
CLASSIFICATION ACT 1993 .................................................... .4 
A Purpose and Policy ................................................................. .4 
B Key Definitions ....................................................................... 6 
1 "Publication" ................................................................. 6 
2 "Objectionable material" ............................................... 6 
(a) Legislative provisions ...................................... 6 
(b) Effect of the Moonen decision ......................... 8 
3 "Child" or "young person" .......................................... 10 
C Offences ................................................................................ 11 
1 Generation and dissemination offences ....................... 12 
(a) Strict liability offences .................................. 12 
(i) Impact for ISPs ..................................... 13 
(ii) Non-commercial activity ...................... 13 
(b) Mens rea offences .......................................... 15 
2 Possession .................................................................... 16 
D Search and Seizure ................................................................ 16 
1 FVPCA warrant ........................................................... 1 7 
2 Seizure without warrant.. ............................................. 18 
E Other Practical Matters ......................................................... 19 
1 Authority to prosecute ................................................. 19 
2 Laying of Charges ....................................................... 20 
IV THE IMP ACT OF THE INTERNET ................................... 20 
A Introduction ........................................................................... 20 
B Features Advantageous to Child Pornographers ................... 21 
C Conclusion ............................................................................ 25 
V INVESTIGATORY CHALLENGES ................................... 25 
A Introduction ........................................................................... 25 
B Jursidiction ............................................................................ 26 
1 Introduction ................................................................. 26 
2 Mutual assistance ......................................................... 27 
3 Interpol ......................................................................... 27 
4 International co-operation required ............................. 28 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY OF 
WELLINGTON 
Te Whare Wananga 
o te Upoko o te Ika a Maui 
LIBRARY 
]I) 
ABSTRACT 
The Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 was 
enacted prior to the Internet-revolution. As such, the Act responded to 
the challenges of objectionable material in physical form. This paper 
examines, from a Jaw enforcement perspective, the responsiveness of 
the Act to child pornography in the Internet-age. The exploration of 
the resulting issues is influenced by the prime objective of the Act in 
respect of child pornography: to ban child pornography from New 
Zealand. 
While this paper does not intend to reach definitive conclusions, it is 
clear that New Zealand needs to address the realities of a borderless 
community. Action must be taken to address the significant 
investigatory weaknesses and, to a lesser extent, prosecutorial 
challenges caused the Act ' s pre-Internet origins. 
Any attempt to achieve an effective ban on Internet child pornography 
will require a combination of technological and legislative responses. 
However, individual State Jaw enforcement agencies cannot 
successfully confront the issue in isolation. An international 
multiagency response is required to effectively deal with child 
pornography on the Internet. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 7,500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The year, 1993: the eve of the Internet revolution. New 
Zealand had the luxury of isolation: borders that were physical , not 
just lines on a map. That isolation gave a sense of remoteness from 
"overseas" problems like child pornography. Comfort was taken in 
the fact that child pornography, at that time, could only get into New 
Zealand in physical form: books, videos, and films. The comments of 
the 1989 Committee of Inquiry into Pornography reveals the feelings 
of security that isolation brought: 1 
While it is clear that child pornography is available in New Zealand, little is 
known about its extent . . .. We assume that some child pornography that is 
commercially produced, especially in the United States and Europe, is 
brought into the country in person or by mail , by those interested in obtaining 
this material. However, Customs has not seized any such material in the last 
four or five years. 
Parliament's response to the outside threat of child pornography was 
to pass the Films, Videos, and Publications Act 1993 ("FVPCA"). 
When the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Bill 
was introduced to the House a greater understanding of the issues 
surrounding child pornography within New Zealand was starting to 
develop.2 However, only one Member, the Hon G Lee, recognised 
1 Committee of Inquiry into Pornography Pornography: Report of the Ministen·a1 
Committee of Inquiry into Pornography (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1989) 
43. 
2 See the comments of Hon TWM Tirikatene-Sullivan (2 December 1992) 532 
NZPD 12772 with regard to the growing number of seizures of pornographic 
videotapes , at that time the matter was before the House. 
2 
that the format of pornography delivery may change.
3 He called it 
"high technology pornography". He envisaged "bulletin boards" and 
"video phones" being the means of delivery. At that time no one 
foresaw the Internet and the window of opportunity it brought to all, 
including those who wished to access child pornography. Today 
though, that realisation is truly upon New Zealand and the rest of the 
international community.4 Interpol has categorised present reality in 
h. s t 1s manner: 
The growth of information technology has transformed the production of 
child pornography into a sophisticated, world-wide "cottage" industry: 
this means that technology has made it possible to produce and distribute 
pornographic material at home. Anyone with access to a personal 
computer and a modem can connect up to commercial on-line services 
and to the Internet, this remarkable computer network connecting millions 
of people all over the world. 
In fact, today and in the future , the Internet is well on its way to becoming 
the most significant factor in child sexual exploitation, and the principal 
means for exchanging child pornography. It defies comparison with all 
other means communication, both traditional and modem. 
The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of the 
Internet on the enforcement of the FVPCA.
6 The paper aims to 
examine the consequences for FVPCA investigations and prosecutions 
where offending relating to child pornography is facilitated by online 
3 Hon G Lee (2 December 1992) 532 NZPD 12767. 
4 If evidence is required, see the papers presented to the Combating Child 
Pornography on the Internet Conference held in Vienna on 29 September - 1 
October 1999. The papers are available from <http://www.stop-childpomog.at>. 
5 Agnes Fournier de Saint Maur "The Sexual Abuse of Children via the Internet: a 
New Challenge for Interpol" (Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, 
Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 1999) <http://www.stop-childpomog.at/ 
ab_maur.asp> (last accessed 3 May 2001). 
6 This paper concentrates on enforcement of the Films. Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993 ("FVPCA") from the perspective of the New Zealand 
Police. While enforcement officers from the Department of Internal Affairs have the 
major role in respect of enforcing the FVPCA, this area is a growing portion of 
Police work and closely related to the investigation of paedophilic activities. 
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means. This paper serves more to identify issues and suggest options 
for addressing those issues rather than to reach definitive conclusions. 
II CHILD PORNOGRAPHY -A WORKING DEFINITION 
To facilitate clarity, it is appropriate that what is meant by 
"child pornography" is generally understood. While it will become 
clear that for the purposes of the operation of the FVPCA the term 
"child pornography" is not critical , perceptions of pornography can be 
very subjective. Pornography comes from the Greek roots "porne" 
and "graphos". Feminist writer Andrea Dworkin has rendered the 
literal translation of those terms as "the graphic portrayal of woman as 
whores". 7 That particular definition conveys the inherent degradation 
present in such material. Interpol has adopted the following definition 
specific to child pornography: 8 
Child pornography is created as a consequence of sexual exploitation or 
abuse of a child. It can be defined as any means of depicting or promoting 
the sexual exploitation of a child, including written or audio material , which 
focuses on the child's sexual behaviour or genitals . 
That definition provides an adequate working definition of "child 
pornography" for the purposes of this paper. 
7 Andrea Dworkin "Pornography and male supremacy" Letters from a War Zone 
(Secker and Warburg, London, 1988) 230. 
8 Agnes Fournier de Saint Maur "The Sexual Abuse of Children via the Internet: a 
New Challenge for Interpol" (Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, 
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III THE FILMS, VIDEOS, AND PUBLICATIONS 
CLASSIFICATION ACT 1993 
A Purpose and Policy 
The FVPCA provided New Zealand's first unified 
classification and enforcement regime for all types of publications.
9
• 
10 
It was heralded as a means of providing an integrated approach, a 
"clear, coherent, and purposeful [piece of] legislation . . . to 
rationalise the approach to classification of visual and printed matter, 
to revise and reform the criteria of classification, and to facilitate 
public access to the classification system" .11 
In addition to unifying censorship processes, the FVPCA had a 
specific purpose in respect of child pornography: 12 
[O)ne category of material is marked for prohibition on its own terms. 
The Government has decide that all forms of child pornography will be 
banned outright ... The Government believes that it is not acceptable for 
this type of material to be available, so the opportunity for abusers of any 
type to have the use of this pornography to excite themselves, or to 
condition their victims, will no longer be available. 
Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 1999) <http://www.stop-childpornog.at/ 
ab_maur.asp> (last accessed 3 May 2001). 
9 The FVPCA came into full force on 1 October 1994: Films, Videos, and 
Publications Classification Act Commencement Order 1994. 
10 The only matters to fall outside the provisions of the legislation are matters 
covered by the Broadcasting Standards Authority under the Broadcasting Act 1989. 
11 Hon J Shipley (2 December 1992) 532 NZPD 12758. 
12 Hon J Shipley (2 December 1992) 532 NZPD 12759-12760. 
5 
Thus, Parliament specifically acknowledged where the real harm in 
child pornography lies: the use of child pornography by paedophiles 
both for their own pleasure and, more ominously, as a means to make 
their victims more receptive to their paedophilic advances. As 
Interpol has stated "pornography is used by child abusers as a mean 
[sic] of desensitising children in order ' to lower their inhibitions ' ." 13 
That process may take years and relies upon progressive exposure to 
material of escalating sexual content. The process, if successful , 
really amounts to a reconditioning of the child or young person away 
from the generally accepted social prohibition on sexual activity 
between children or young persons and adults. 
In acknowledging the role pornography has in conditioning a victim, 
Parliament recognised the potential for harm created by the mere 
availability of such material: it puts the most vulnerable group in our 
society at greater risk of victimisation. 
13 Agnes Fournier de Saint Maur "The Sexual Abuse of Children via the Internet: a 
New Challenge for Interpol" (Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, 
Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 1999) <http://www.stop-childpomog.at/ 
ab_maur.asp> (last accessed 3 May 2001). 
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B Key Definitions 
1 "Publication " 
As a result of the unified classification approach, and its 
corollary need to cover a diverse range of media, "publication" was 
given a broad meaning in section 2. 14 "Publication" means: 
(a) Any film, book, sound recording, picture, newspaper, photograph, 
photographic negative, photographic plate, or photographic slide: 
(b) Any print or writing: 
(c) Any paper or other thing-
(i) That has printed or impressed upon it, or otherwise 
shown upon it, any word, statement, sign, or representation; or 
(ii) On which is recorded or stored any information that, by 
the use of any computer or other electronic device, is capable of being 
reproduced or shown as any word, statement, sign, or representation. 
Section 2(c) (ii) attempts to provide a technology-neutral 
definition. All that subparagraph requires for a publication is a means 
of storing information which, by application of technology, results in 
comprehensible representations. It is clearly broad enough to 
encompass data present in a computer system or network, including 
the Internet. 
2 "Objectionable material" 
(a) Legislative provisions 
The other key concept that the FVPCA turns upon is the 
concept of objectionability. 
s 
s 
,, 
y 
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The general definition of what is objectionable is contained in 
section 3(1): 
For the purposes of this Act, a publication is objectionable if it describes, 
depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals with matters such as sex, horror, 
crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that the availability of the 
publication is likely to be injurious to the public good. 
According to Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review 
(1999) 17 CRNZ 159 that "general test" is given effect by the 
subsequent subsections. 15 A publication will, therefore, be 
"objectionable" if it is: 
(a) Classified as objectionable by the Office of the Censor; or 
(b) Deemed objectionable bys 3(2) FVPCA. 16 
Section 3(2) provides: 
A publication shall be deemed to be objectionable for the purposes of this 
Act if the publication promotes or supports, or tends to promote or 
support,-
(a) The exploitation of children, or young persons, or both, for sexual 
purposes; or 
(b) The use of violence or coercion to compel any person to 
participate in, or submit to, sexual conduct; or 
(c) Sexual conduct with or upon the body of a dead person; or 
(d) The use of urine or excrement in association with degrading or 
dehumanising conduct or sexual conduct; or 
(e) Bestiality; or 
(f) Acts of torture or the infliction of extreme violence or extreme 
cruelty. 
It should be noted that all the acts specified in subsection 2, with the 
exception of paragraph (d), involve criminal conduct. 17 
14 See the Appendix to this paper for all legislative provisions of substantive 
importance to this paper. 
15 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (1999) 17 CRNZ 159, para 4. 
16 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (1999) 17 CRNZ 159, para 5. 
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It is material that falls under section 3 (2) (a) FVPCA that is of 
concern in this paper: publications that promote, support, or tend to 
promote or support, the exploitation of children, or young persons, or 
both for sexual purposes. 
(b) Effect of the Moonen decision 
By dint of that provision child pornography is, or at least was 
intended to be, 18 automatically objectionable and therefore banned.
19 
The intention of the provision was clear until December 1999 when 
the Court of Appeal delivered its decision in Moonen v Film and 
Literature Board of Review. 20 That case introduced section 14 New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (freedom of expression) 
considerations into the process of deciding whether a publication 
"promotes or supports, or tends to promote or support" the prohibited 
activity. Moonen held that those words required more than mere 
d . · 21 ep1ct1on. The effect of the publication must be to advocate or 
encourage the exploitation of children or young persons for sexual 
purposes. 
17 See Part VII Crimes Act 1961. In particular, see: ss 127-129A, ss 131-135, ss 139-
141 (sexual assaults and sexual conduct with minors provisions) , ss 143 (bestiality) , 
and s 150 (misconduct in respect of human remains). 
18 "The Government has decided that all forms of child pornography will be banned 
outright." Hon J Shipley's comments in the introduction speech for the Films, 
Videos, and Publications Classification Bill: Hon J Shipley (2 December 1992) 532 
NZPD 12759. 
19 Presently the Department of Internal Affairs continues to hold that position in 
their advice to their Minister: Department of Internal Affairs Briefing to the 
Minister of Internal Affairs: November 2000 (Wellington, 2000) part 8, 3. 
20 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (1999) 1 7 CRNZ 159. 
9 
In the prior leading case, News Media Ltd v Film and 
Literature Board of Review (1997) 4 HRNZ 410 the High Court held 
that section 3 is inconsistent with freedom of expression rights and, 
therefore, they do not constrain the application of section 3.22 
Currently, however, there is a level of uncertainty as to what will and 
will not be deemed objectionable. Can any material be automatically 
objectionable? In light of the Moonen decision, the answer is 
probably no. 
Reaction to the Moonen decision lead to the introduction of the 
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification (Prohibition of Child 
Pornography) Amendment Bill on 2 August 2000. The stated aim of 
that Bill is to reverse the effect of the Moonen decision, and return the 
section 3(2) deeming provisions to the status of an automatic 
prohibition.23 The Government Administration Select Committee has 
been charged, as a result of the Bill, with inquiring into the workings 
of the FVPCA. The Terms of Reference of the Inquiry of the 
Government Administration Committee into the Operation of the 
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 and Related 
Issues include inquiring into: 24 
21Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (1999) 17 CRNZ 159, para 29. 
22 News Media Ltd v Film and Literature Board of Review (1997) 4 HRNZ 410,420. 
23 See the speech of the Hon Anne Tolley on (16 August 2000) 586 NZPD 4931. 
24 Government Administration Select Committee "The Terms of Reference of the 
Inquiry of the Government Administration Committee into the Operation of the 
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 and Related Issues" 
(Wellington, 2001) <http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/publications/GAtor .htm> 
(last accessed 13 June 2001). 
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(a) "The definition of 'objectionable', . . . to determine 
whether the Court of Appeal's narrow interpretation [in 
Moonen] adequately carr[ies] out the intent of the Act"; 
and 
(b) "Whether ... the Bill of Rights Act 1990 [sic] should 
apply to all matters prescribed in [section 3(2)] of the Act 
or whether ... publications that promote the matters in 
that section [should be] 'objectionable' [notwithstanding 
the 1990 Act]". 
To that end, the Select Committee received submissions on the issue 
until 4 May 2001. The matter remains before the Committee. 
3 "Child" or "young person" 
It will be noted that what constitutes a child or young person 
for the purposes of the FVPCA is not defined. 
25 However, for the 
purpose of the FVPCA the actual age of the individual portrayed in 
the publication is irrelevant. 
News Media demonstrates this point.
26 In that case the New 
Troth newspaper published classified advertisements for sexual 
25 As a general guide the definitions provided by section 2 Children, Young Persons, 
and their Families Act 1989 are helpful. A "child" is a girl or boy under 14 and a 
"young person" is a boy or girl over 14 but under 17. 
26 News Media Ltd v Film and Literature Board of Review (1997) 4 HRNZ 410. 
J 
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services. Some of the advertisements included references to 
schoolchildren. 27 The High Court stated:28 
It is possible that the asserted "school boys" or "school girls" are 
somewhat older; but titillation of that character can create an atmosphere 
in which the minds of some later will tum to the real thing. 
Thus, establishing age is not a necessary element m establishing 
objectionability under section 3(2)(a) . 
Nor, by the same logic, is it necessary to establish that the 
person depicted in images is a real individual. The Internet provides 
the ability to alter pictures and create pseudo and morphed children. 
Overseas, there are some jurisdictions in which digitally altered or 
produced images do not fall within the definition of the prohibited 
material because of the wording of the offence.29 Moonen , however, 
makes it clear the key is the publication's effect, not merely the 
d . . . If 30 ep1ct10n 1tse . 
C Offences 
For the purposes of this paper, consideration of offences 
relating to objection material will be limited to sections 123, 124, and 
131. Section 127 also deals with objectionable material , in respect to 
27 For example: "Naughty School Girls" was the title for a peep show 
advertisement. 
28 News Media Ltd v Film and Literature Board of Review (1997) 4 HRNZ 410, 420 
29 Ulrich Sieber Criminal Law Provisions against Child Pornography: A Legal 
Comparative Study for the Creation of Worldwide Minimum Standards (German 
Federal Ministry of Justice, Bonn, 1999). 
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exhibiting or displaying objectionable material to an individual under 
18 years of age. However, the focus of this paper is on the 
implications of the Internet's facilitation of transactional and 
possessory activities, not end-use results in and of themselves. 
1 Generation and dissemination offences 
Sections 123 and 124 can be readily classified as generation 
and dissemination offences. Those sections deal with the activities of 
creating and distributing, or offering for distribution, publications 
which fall foul of section 3 FVPCA. The prohibited activities involve 
making, copying, supplying, and distributing objectionable 
publications. 
In respect to these generation and dissemination activities, 
there are two types of offences: strict liability and mens rea offences. 
(a) Strict liability offences 
The strict liability offences are set out m section 123. The 
imposition of strict liability is achieved through subsection 3, which 
provides that absence of knowledge, or reasonable cause to believe 
that the material was objectionable is no defence. 
31 
30 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (1999) 17 CRNZ 159, para 29. 
31 There has been no New Zealand examination of whether, not withstanding that 
provision, there could be a defence of absence of fault. For an examination of the 
defence of absence of fault see Mackenzie v Civil Aviation Department (1983) 
1 CRNZ 38. However, given the purpose of the legislation was to ban child 
pornography in New Zealand it would appear that subsection 3 is aimed at effecting 
that ban. In light of Millar v Ministry of Transport (1986) 2 CRNZ 216 the 
legislative purpose is highly suggestive of an absolute offence classification, as an 
absence of fault defence would rapidly undermine ban on child pornography. 
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(i) Impact for ISPs 
Section 123(1)(b) has significant import for Internet service 
providers ("ISPs"). It provides that it is an offence to copy an 
objectionable publication for the purpose of distribution. "Distribute" 
is defined in section 122 as meaning "to deliver, to give, or to offer". 
The very nature and purpose of ISP activities, delivering copies of 
pages called upon to the computer accessing a site, is caught by the 
concept of "distribution". When such potential for primary liability 
exists,32 there is no need to examine concepts of ISP secondary 
1. b·1· 33 Ia 1 1ty. 
(ii) Non-commercial activity 
Section 123(4) FVPCA provides that: 
Without limiting the generality of this section, a publication may be-
(a) Supplied (within the meaning of that term in section 2 of 
this Act) for the purposes of paragraphs (b), (c) , and (d) of 
subsection (1) of this section; or 
(b) Made available for the purposes of paragraph (e) of that 
subsection-
not only in a physical form but also by means of the electronic 
transmission (whether by way of facsimile transmission, electronic mail , 
or other similar means of communication, other than by broadcasting) of 
the contents of the publication. 
32 While an ISP may not escape liability on the basis of absence of fault (if the strict 
liability categorisation is correct), another defence may be available. It is a defence 
to a charge of possession if the ISP is not aware that it possesses the material at all 
(independent of awareness of content). See Julian v Green (1989) 5 CRNZ 97, 98: 
"A person cannot possess something of which he [or she] is unaware". The factual 
circumstances of each particular case will be influential in any decision as to 
"awareness". 
33 Of course, whether prosecutions against ISP would be appropriate from a practical 
co-operation perspective, is another question. 
14 
Thus, there is no question that electronic delivery methods are covered 
where the material is being sold, hired, or offered for sale or hire 
within the frame work of the particular provisions. 
While prefaced "without limiting the generality of this section", this 
subsection brings into clear focus the question of whether monetary 
consideration is a necessary element of a transaction involving child 
pornography before a FVPCA offence will be established.
34 This is of 
particular import for policing paedophile groups like the Wonderland 
Club. That group had an entry "fee" of 10,000 child pornography 
images. Its membership was about mutual "appreciation" of child 
pornography, not commercial gain. Publications m such 
circumstances cannot, in any normal sense of the words, be said to be 
sold, hired, or offered for sale or hire. Thus, any Wonderland Club-
type transaction would not amount to "supplying". 
35 
However, a further question arises . Does section 123(4) have any 
import m respect to electronic distribution offences under 
section 123(1) (b) FVPCA where no consideration is given or 
received? While there is no precedent on this point, the preliminary 
words of section 123(4) appear to permit the application of 
section 123 to the electronic delivery of objectionable publications 
where no consideration is exchanged. The perceived need for 
34"Paedophiles jailed for porn ring" (13 February 2001) BBC News Online United 
Kingdom <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_l l 68000/l 168112.stm> (last 
accessed on 20 May 2001). 
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section 123(4) may have been based upon a concern as to whether 
there could be online contract formation. This makes some sense 
given that the Act was, after all , prepared while debate still raged as to 
whether offer and acceptance by electronic means was possible.36 
(b) Mens rea offences 
Section 124 provides that all the acts punishable under 
section 123(1) are subject to a higher penalty where they are 
committed with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the 
material is objectionable. In the case of an individual, the penalty is 
one year's imprisonment or a $20,000 fine; a corporation is subject to 
a $50,000 fine. Those penalties compare with fines of $5,000 and 
$15,000, respectively, for the equivalent strict liability offences. 
Given that paedophiles very rationale for dealing with 
objectionable material is that it does depict the exploitation of children 
for sexual purposes, theoretically intention should be easily 
established. However, the key 1s providing probative evidence 
without prejudicing the defendant. While search history data may be 
valuable in demonstrating intention of the computer user, establishing 
the identity of the computer user at the time relevant searches were 
35 That applies to physical transactions, as well, where there is no commercial 
transaction. 
36 That debate has yet to be permanently settled. "Today, our legal system is riddled 
with rules and requirements that are based on the primacy of paper. The growth of 
the Internet and electronic communications has called into question the legitimacy 
of those paper-based rules. Indeed, these requirements are often viewed as barriers 
to electronic commerce, both domestically and internationally. " Amelia H Boss 
"Tearing Down Paper Barriers" (14 February 2000) Legal Times United States 
<http://wwwS.law.com/dc-shl/display.cfm?id=2732> (last visited 18 June 2001). 
16 
conducted provides another difficulty. Conclusively establishing that 
the defendant is the person who conducted the relevant searches will 
depend on inculpatory statements made in respect of restrictions on 
access to and use of the computer in question. 
2 Possession 
Section 131 provides for a strict liability offence (subsection 3) 
for possession of objectionable material without lawful authority or 
excuse.37 The penalty for a corporation possessing objectionable 
material is a $5,000 fine. An individual faces a fine of $2,000. 
Again, ISPs face the sceptre of criminal liability without 
having knowledge, or even reasonable cause to suspect, that the 
material on their servers is objectionable. 
D Search and Seizure 
Given the predominance of monetary penalties for offences 
under the FVPCA, specific search and seizure powers were required. 
Generally, section 198 Summary Proceedings Act 1957 provides 
sufficient search powers for offences. However, it requires that the 
suspected offence be one carrying a penalty of imprisonment. Thus, 
without specific provisions the FVPCA would have been ineffectual 
in respect of locating evidence and seizing objectionable material. 
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1 FVPCA warrant 
Under the FVPCA objectionable material can be searched for 
and seized under a section 109 warrant. Such a warrant can only be 
granted by a judicial officer.38 He or she must have reasonable 
grounds to believe that there is in or on any place or thing:39 
(a) An objectionable publication that is being kept for the 
purposes of committing an offence under sections 123, 
124,40 127, and 129;41 
(b) Any evidence of such offence; or 
(c) Any thing intended to be used for the purpose of 
committing such an offence. 
The application has to be made by a Police Officer42 on oath, in 
writing, setting out the grounds for the application to enable the 
judicial officer to reasonably conclude that one of the relevant limbs 
of section 109(1) has been established. 
It is imperative to recognise that by limiting the offence 
provisions to sections 123, 124, 127, and 129, there is no power to 
37 Subsections 3 and 4 provide certain classes of persons with authority or excuse to 
possess objectionable material. The aim of these provisions will enable the effective 
disposal of proceedings under the FVPCA. 
38 Either a District Court Judge, Justice of the Peace, Community Magistrate, or 
Registrar. 
39 Section 109(1)(a), (b), and (c) FVPCA. 
40 The making or dissemination offences, with and without mens rea. 
41 The display of objection material offences. 
42 Or an Inspector. 
18 
obtain a search warrant for an offence of mere possession of 
objectionable material under section 131 FVPCA. 
2 Seizure without warrant 
However, from a policing perspective,
43 it is more common for 
objectionable material to be seized during the execution of lawful 
duty. Under section 108, upon discovering a publication that an 
Officer believes, on reasonable grounds, to be objectionable, he or she 
may seize the item without requiring further authority. Section 108 
provides the only authority to seize objectionable material that is 
merely being possessed (section 131), as opposed to generated or 
disseminated (sections 123 or 124). 
Where electronic material 1s found and seized under 
section 108 there may be reasonable grounds to justify applying for 
and obtaining a section 109 warrant to search for further material or 
• • 44 
seize eqmpment. 
43 Given the nature of Police work including resourcing and prioritisation of offence 
investigations. 
44 For example, where computer disks are located which suggest by some means, 
most usually labelling, that they contain objectionable material , if there is also a 
computer present with an internet connection, it may give rise to the belief that an 
offence under section 123(1)(b) (a copying offence) has or is intended to be 
committed via that computer. A search warrant in those circumstances may be 
obtained to seize the computer or, alternatively, the data by cloning the computer. 
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E Other Practical Matters 
1 Authority to prosecute 
Once material has been seized and been determined to be 
within section 3(2) , an authorisation to prosecute must be obtained. 
The power to consent to prosecution has been delegated by the 
Attorney-General to the Commissioner of Police under section 144. 
The Commissioner in tum has delegated that power to the District 
Commanders (who hold the rank of Superintendent). That delegation 
was achieved by written authority dated 28 October 1997 pursuant to 
section 145.45 
45 Before a District Commander can authorise a prosecution, legal advice must be 
given as to "objectionability". In addition, the District Commander has to formulate 
his or her own conclusion that the material is objectionable. 
As a result of Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (1999) 17 
CRNZ 159 both the Legal Adviser (in giving advise on whether the material falls 
foul of section 3(2)(a)) and the District Commander (in reaching a conclusion as to 
objectionability) , need to consider New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
considerations. Thus, every decision to charge a person with an offence under the 
FVPCA, even that of simple possession, will have to first consider whether it is 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society to view the publication as 
promoting or supporting, or tending to promote or support, the sexual exploitation of 
children and young people. The fact that a publication provides "sexual titillation" 
based upon the exploitation of children and young persons appears to provide no 
justification to conclude that it should be deemed objectionable. There must be 
something more than mere depiction. In addition, the reasons for finding that the 
depiction has the prohibited effect must be clearly spelt out by both the Legal 
Adviser providing the advice and the District Manager. 
Moonen raises the reality that every decision to prosecute could be subject 
to challenge for breach of section 14 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, if the decision 
maker fails to adequately articulate why he or she decided that the material 
promoted or supported, or tended to promoted or support, the sexual exploitation of 
children or young persons. 
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2 Laying of Charges 
Once charges have been authorised, they may be laid in the 
District Court 's summary jurisdiction: section 142 FVPCA. Under 
section 143 Police have two years to lay the charge. 
IV THEIMPACTOFTHEINTERNET 
A Introduction 
There can be no question that the Internet has given the 
opportunity to access a vast array of child pornography material that 
was not physically available in New Zealand before its advent. This is 
demonstrated by contrasting the absolute minimal seizures described 
by the Committee of Inquiry into Pornography with Max Taylor's 
research observations about material available globally.
46 As 
Professor Taylor notes, though, asking how much more objectionable 
material is available to Internet users may not be the sensible question. 
He suggests that the "more sensible and more frightening question to 
ask ... is how many children are involved. "
47 
46 Compare Committee of Inquiry into Pornography Pornography: Report of the 
Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Pornography (Department of Justice, 
Wellington, 1989) 43 and Max Taylor "The Nature and Dimensions of Child 
Pornography on the Internet" (Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, 
Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 1999) <http://www.stop-
childpornog.at/pa_taylor.html> (last accessed 3 May 2001). 
47 Professor Taylor concludes that in a 50,000 picture sample (all of which were 
downloaded from the Internet) , there are 2,000 (different) boys and girls shown in 
explicit sexual situations and another 2,000 positioned in erotic nude poses. Only 
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B Feature Advantageous to Child Pornographers 
Cyberspace has a greater effect than merely allowing access to 
greater amounts and diversity of material. It facilitates a number of 
features beneficial to users of child pornography: 
(a) A generally free source of material without physical 
boundaries to restrain access. 
(b) A near instantaneous means of satisfying the desire for 
more material.48 That ability to access new and exciting 
material as one desires without practical barriers to require 
the controlling of that desire may lead to habituation. 
Habituation in return may lead to a greater propensity to 
attempt real-world offending against children: 49 
A recent quotation from a posting to a paedophile Bulletin 
Board illustrates this process from the user 's perspective " . . . 
With this hobby [referring to paedophilia] we get bored after a 
while with the usual and we risk a bit to get new stuff or actual 
15% of the sexually explicit photographs in his sample were taken within the past 
10-15 years. The frightening fact is that 15% yielded 300- 350 children who have 
been photographed within the last 10-15 years whilst being subjected to serious 
sexual assaults, then those photographs have been made publicly available: Max 
Taylor "The Nature and Dimensions of Child Pornography on the Internet" 
(Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 
1999) <http://www.stop-childpornog.at/pa_taylor.html> (last accessed 3 May 2001). 
48 See Max Taylor "The Nature and Dimensions of Child Pornography on the 
Internet" (Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, Vienna, 29 September - 1 
October 1999) <http://www.stop-childpornog.at/pa_taylor.html> (last accessed 3 
May 2001). 
49 Max Taylor "The Nature and Dimensions of Child Pornography on the Internet" 
(Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 
1999) <http://www.stop-childpornog.at/pa_taylor.html> (last accessed 3 May 2001). 
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experience. It 's a natural progression. Like stealing. You start 
small. Get bored. Go for bigger stuff .. , 
(c) The reproduction of objectionable material without loss of 
quality and the production of material including morphed 
images (pseudo children). so 
The reproduction of material by digital means ensures that 
duplicated material is as clear as the original. With 
physical copies of objectionable material , the copies 
deteriorate. 51 Eventually the copies become so 
indecipherable that there is no point in attempting to 
reproduce further copies: eventually there is a limit to the 
number of users. However, with digital material there are 
no limitations on the numbers of end users. 
Digital production techniques also overcome the pre-
existing requirement that new material be physically 
produced. The potential for the production of new 
material through morphed children has greatly increased 
the potential for new images being produced and 
circulated. That may be seen as a potentially good result: 
digitally produced child pornography limits the 
so The Head of the Trafficking in Human Beings Branch, Interpol , classified the 
growth of information technology as making the "production of child pornography 
into a sophisticated, world-wide 'cottage industry"': Agnes Fournier de Saint Maur 
"The Sexual Abuse of Children via the Internet: a New Challenge for Interpol " 
(Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 
1999) <http://www.stop-childpomog.at/ab_maur.asp> (last accessed 3 May 2001). 
51 Be it books being photocopied or videos being dubbed. 
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exploitation of real children. The process of habituation, 
however, belies that apparently advantage and as News 
Media stated, "the minds of some will ... tum to the real 
thing".52 
(d) A level of anonymity through merely being identified by 
an IP address or by using technology aimed at providing 
extra anonymity. Simple techniques for avoiding being 
identified by an IP address include providing false details. 
It is common for ISPs not to check the validity of the 
details supplied to it.53 Specific technological tools 
include anonymous remailers and on-the-fly or 
dynamically assigned IP addresses. Of course, venues 
such as cybercafes also provide a level of anonymity for 
distribution of material, but understandably, they do not 
provide the requisite privacy for using the material. 
(e) A greater level of control both in the material selected and 
the medium of storage, in particular the capability to use 
detection evasion techniques. Detection evasion 
techniques include simple mechanisms such as password 
protection, enlarging the computer's cache to enable 
downloaded material to be retained without saving (which 
52News Media Ltd v Film and Literature Board of Review (1997) 4 HRNZ 410, 420. 
53 Edwin C MacGillavry "Internet Service Providers and Criminal Investigation" 
(Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 
24 
allows the user to claim no knowledge of the material), 
and ability to delete data almost instantaneously, although 
complete wiping of evidence requires a little more 
knowledge. 
(f) The opportunity for greater security through certain 
protocols. Those protocols include encryption, bot 
controlled servers to restrict access, "invisible" IRC 
(Internet relay chat) video conferencing protocols such as 
CUSeeMe (also known as CU C Me), and direct 
connections on closed networks to enable file sharing. 
(g) A virtual community to reinforce the belief systems and 
behaviours related to the use of child pornography. 
(h) The potential for participation in real-time sexual activity 
with children. An example of such activity was the 
technology-facilitated abuse of children by the members 
of the Orchid Club:5
4 
The Orchid Club was a group of sixteen male child sex abusers 
coming from several different countries united only by their 
paedophilia. Each of these men had a video camera attached to 
their screens which enabled them together to watch a girl of 10 
1999) <http://www.stop-childpornog.at/pa_gillavry.html> (last accessed 3 May 
2001). 
54 Ron O'Grady "Opening Address" (Child Pornography on the Internet Experts 
Meeting, Lyon, 28 May 1998) <http;//www.ecpat.net/Childporn/Ron's.html> (last 
accessed 14 May 2001). See also Alexander Wood "National Crime Squad, United 
Kingdom - Briefing Note" (Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, Vienna, 
29 September -1 October 1999) <http://www.stop-childpornog.at/ab_maur.asp> 
(last accessed 3 May 2001). 
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years being sexually abused in real time. They could directly 
participate in the abuse while it was taking place by offering 
suggestions and encouragement to the abuser. 
C Conclusion 
All these features present challenges for policing both in terms 
of investigating and prosecuting offences under the FVPCA. 
V INVESTIGATORY CHALLENGES 
A Introduction 
The investigatory challenges obviously are greatest where 
there are "gaps" in investigatory powers. The "gaps" arise from the 
fact that the FVPCA framework did not foresee the need for more 
responsive investigatory tools. The provisions enacted were deemed 
satisfactory to meet "real-world" objectionable material issues. 
The features of the Internet that are advantageous to those 
using and dealing in child pornography were not relevant to child 
pornography in physical form. While the Act attempted to deal in 
technologically neutral terms, there were no means to predict the 
specific advantages that exist by means of the Internet today. 
26 
One of the biggest investigatory challenges is having adequate 
resources to address the special challenges that cyberspace presents. 
However, this is not the forum for that debate. The following 
discussion will aim to identify the technical and legal difficulties that 
the Internet has introduced in respect to enforcing the FVPCA. In all 
this, it is important to remember that the Act intended to protect 
children from being exploited sexually by means of the depictions and 
to prevent paedophiles having a tool at their disposal. Any potential 
solutions to the various issues need to provide a "balance" to the 
advantages that the Internet provides for "users" of child pornography 
if effective policing of that material is to be achieved. 
B Jurisdiction 
1 Introduction 
Obviously, like all aspects of the Internet, jurisdictional issues 
are to the fore. New Zealand Police have only the power to enforce 
New Zealand law within New Zealand territory. However, 
investigating FVPCA offences in cyberspace, at the very least, 
increases the potential for inquiries to lead overseas. 
While Police are not totally devoid of options when 
investigating trans-boarder offending, the traditional means of 
receiving evidence from overseas have inherent weaknesses that do 
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not facilitate effective policing reactions m the age of the 
instantaneous world wide web. 
2 Mutual assistance 
The slow, bureaucratic process of the formal international 
assistance provisions is not available in respect of FVPCA offences. 
The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992 requires a 
penalty of two years' imprisonment under New Zealand law before 
the benefits of the scheme can be co-opted. The most severe penalty 
under the FVPCA is one year's imprisonment under section 124 for a 
person who knowing! y undertakes an act that feeds the generation and 
dissemination process. 
3 Interpol 
On a more informal basis, Interpol provides a means for 
requests for inquiries to be conducted in other jurisdictions through 
Interpol offices around the world. The process to activate offshore 
inquiries is as follows. New Zealand Police send a request to the 
Interpol office in Wellington, which, in tum, sends it to relevant extra-
jurisdictional Interpol office. That office then forwards the request to 
the local law enforcement agency for follow up. Any results are 
returned via the reverse conduits. 
The results of such requests are heavily dependent on the local 
agency's resources and the local laws enabling the inquiries requested 
28 
to be made. While not as limited in application as the Mutual 
Assistance scheme, the process is unpredictable in the sense of what 
response will be achieved and in what timeframe. Just as importantly, 
the evidential viability of information collected is dependant on the 
methodology used by the foreign officers in collecting the information 
sought and the ability to adduce satisfactory evidence of such 
investigations at hearing. 
55 
4 International co-operation required 
At present the absence of international co-operation in respect 
of child pornography (except on an ad hoe basis, such as Operation 
Cathedral)56 inhibits effective investigation of offences. Effective 
investigations require formal international co-operation measures that 
are responsive, in terms of speed and effective in collecting the 
evidence required to obtain a conviction in New Zealand.
57 
55 For example, via video link, or some such method, without prohibitory costs. 
56 Operation Cathedral was a British National Criminal Intelligence Service lead 
multi-jursidictional co-operative policing operation that broke up an international 
paedophile ring, the Wonderland Club. It resulted in the imprisonment of seven 
British men in respect of conspiracy to distribute pornographic images. See "Porn 
Ring 'was Real Child Abuse"' <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_ 
l 109000/1109787.stm> (last accessed 3 May 2001) and "Paedophiles Jailed for 
Porn Ring" <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_l 168000/l 168112.stm> 
(last accessed 3 May 2001). 
57 In essence there has to be some coincidence of legal frameworks. The European 
Draft Convention on Cyber-Crime attempts to co-ordinate some standardised 
provisions which European States can implement: Council of Europe Draft 
Convention on Cyber-Crime (Draft 25) <http://convetnions.coe.int/treaty/EN/ 
projects/cybercrime25.htm> (last accessed 14 May 2001). 
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C Anonymity 
1 Introduction 
Anonymity is a perception of the Internet. It does not have to 
be a fact. Professor Max Taylor put it this way: "[t]he Internet is 
anonymous only because we allow it to be". 58 Generally, 
identification information does attach to Internet use. The difficulty is 
obtaining it and making sure it is accurate. 
2 Legislative action required 
In the absence of a legal requirement to record accurate client 
details, for any access to the Internet, those who do not want to be 
identified will attempt find means of avoiding the connection between 
themselves and an account number on an ISP. Simple deception 
measures such as lying, if details are not checked, can defeat accurate 
identification of IP number holders. 
One other method of identification, which, until wireless 
application technology is functional in a widespread context, will be 
valuable, is calling line identification. Calling line identification is the 
information that identifies the telecommunication landline that the 
computer in question is using to access the Internet. That always has a 
58 Max Taylor "The Nature and Dimensions of Child Pornography on the Internet" 
(Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 
1999) <http://www.stop-childpomog.at/pa_taylor.html> (last accessed 3 May 2001). 
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physical point of origin. By nature, it always leads to a specific 
address. 59 
Identity information, be it names and addresses (which are 
linked to IP addesses and calling line identification),
60 can be 
collected from New Zealand based ISPs by means of: 
(a) Disclosure made by the ISP under Information Privacy 
Principle ("IPP") ll(e)(i), section 6 Privacy Act 1993;
61 or 
(b) A FVPCA warrant,62 so Jong as the identification 
information sought is evidence of an offence, not just 
information. 
However, data of that nature has to be first collected and stored 
by the ISP. If it is not, or if it is destroyed too quickly, that lead will 
be Jost. It would seem appropriate that some means of preserving 
such data be developed. Whether it be by legislative imposition or 
industry agreement, the greater the information resources available to 
the investigating officers, the greater the likelihood of success. At 
59 Edwin C MacGillavry "Internet Service Providers and Criminal Investigation" 
(Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 
1999) <http://www.stop-childpornog.aUpa_gillavry.html> (last accessed 3 May 
2001). 
60 Edwin C MacGillavry "Internet Service Providers and Criminal Investigation" 
(Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 
1999) <http://www.stop-childpornog.at/pa_gillavry.html> (last accessed 3 May 
2001) . That may change as wireless application technology develops. 
61 That IPP enables disclosure if the organisation has reasonable grounds for 
believing that disclosure is necessary to avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the 
law by any public sector agency, including the prevention, detection, investigation, 
prosecution, and punishment of offences. 
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present, there is no statutory requirement or industry agreement that 
ISPs capture any such data, let alone that the ISP store it to be 
accessible in the investigation of offences . 
3 International co-operation necessary 
International ISPs, of course, cause the usual difficulties with 
lack of jurisdiction.63 As Operation Cathedral showed, however, even 
in countries where there lacked means to gain disclosure of accurate 
IP account holder details , determined and co-operative police work 
could lead to the identification of the offenders , even those who were 
very careful not to be identified. The limitation on such an ad hoe 
approach is that operation was very resource intensive and unlikely to 
be achievable in respect of single suspects offending against the 
FVPCA. 
D Expanse of the Internet 
1 Introduction 
Another issue is how to locate objectionable material on the 
Internet that is not presently being traded or otherwise disseminated so 
as to be locatable during transmission. "Accidental discovery" under 
section 108 FVPCA may be satisfactory to locate physical 
62 Of course, where the offence being investigated is mere possession, an FVPCA 
warrant is not available. 
63 However, California permits the execution of search warrants based on overseas 
search warrants, without relying on the formal Mutual Assistance provisions. 
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publications but it is not a finely tuned investigation tool in an ever-
expanding electronic environment. 
New Zealand Parliamentarians have acknowledged that 
paedophiles use such material to condition their victims. It would be 
logical to deprive paedophiles of such tools before they can be used. 
Why leave such material in society so that when it is used, whether to 
"excite" or "condition" ,64 it amounts to a revictimisation of those 
depicted? Why would one leave the removal of that material to 
chance when in the Internet setting it could be so readily reproduced 
and distributed? 
2 JSPs and check sum programs 
(a) Check sum programs 
There is the technology available to have ISPs audit their own 
servers. The German Federal Criminal Police have had an ISP trial 
6-
software called PERKEO. :, The software produces check sums of 
files classified as definite pornography. In essence, a file can be 
identified as being identical to a known file by the check sum it 
produces.66 While even an alteration as small as changing the size of 
a picture will produce a different check sum, the automated process is 
64 To use Hon Jenny Shipley ' s words: Hon J Shipley (2 December 1992) 532 NZPD 
12760. 
65 Holger Kind "Combating Child Pornography on the Internet by the German 
Federal Criminal Police Office" (Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, 
Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 1999) <http:// 
www.stop-childpornog.at/pa_kind.html> (last accessed 3 May 2001). 
66 That is the numerical value based on the number of set bits in the file when the 
same formula is applied to the file. "Checksum" Webopedia <http://www. 
webopedia.com!TERM/c/checksum.html> (last accessed 18 June 2001) . 
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far quicker and more accurate in locating files previously identified as 
pornographic than manual means. According to the German Federal 
Criminal Police trials, PERKEO is an effective and efficient means of 
locating child pornography. 
(b) Mandatory disclosure of results required 
Having ISPs conduct electronic checks of the data they have 
control of to identify child pornography would appear a logical and 
effective step to be taken. Whether that is achieved by legislative 
requirement or self regulation by ISPs, the law enforcement outcomes 
would be negligible without the ability to have the results of each 
audit disclosed to enable Police to locate objectionable material and 
act upon it. 
While ISPs can release the material to Police under 
IPP 11 (e)(i) , section 6 Privacy Act 1993, such a release is dependant 
on the individual ISP ' s perspective of the material and its 
consideration of whether it should release the information. 
Attempting to execute section 109 search warrants in respect of every 
PERKEO-type search would be logistically impossible, given that 
effective use of PERKEO requires an ongoing process . New warrants 
would have to be continually sought, as the section 109 warrant only 
covers evidence presently in existance, not evidence created in the 
future by the continual re-execution of the check sum program. 
34 
Legislative provisions requiring such checks to be conducted 
and the results to be disclosed to Police appear to be the most effective 
method of ensuring such information is available for law enforcement 
purposes. 
(c) International co-operation 
Obliging New Zealand ISPs to conduct such audits of their 
servers is one step towards locating objectionable material within New 
Zealand ' s jurisdiction. However, New Zealand users can and do use 
the services of international ISPs. Again, jurisdictional issues arise. 
Without consistent domestic provisions in the countries where New 
Zealanders' foreign ISPs are located, the power to locate known 
pornographic material that may have come into New Zealand would 
be diluted. While the enactment of such provisions in other 
jurisdictions is out of the New Zealand Legislature's control, this fact 
reinforces the realisation that without concerted international co-
ordination in respect of the appropriate legislative approach, readily 
identifiable child pornography will remain in circulation. 
3 Hotlines and tiplines 
In conjunction with having ISPs complete audits of their 
servers, "Hotlines" and "tiplines" would appear to be another means 
of lessening the daunting task of locating objectionable material stored 
within the confines of the Internet. Just like any other offence, public 
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reporting provides an effective means of detection.67 The potential 
invisibility of objectionable material on the Internet, at least as far as 
law enforcement agencies are concerned, given its vastness, provides 
an opportunity for reporting to play a significant role. 
E Surmounting Technological Evasion Techniques 
1 Technological advantage 
Two things, at the very least, must happen if one is serious 
about minimising the exploitation of children and young persons 
through pornography: detection and prevention. 
To ensure detection is possible, the technological means that 
permit paedophiles active on the Internet to evade detection must be 
matched and surpassed by the technological investigation tools at 
Police disposal. In respect of preventing the further exploitation of 
children, the closed groups which paedophiles form need to be 
penetrated and intervention effected by prosecutions based upon 
evidence gathered. Given that such groups are subject to 
technological protection both by the communication techniques they 
use and the technology they use to prevent access by unknown 
67 The Department of Internal Affairs has a Tipline email address to which sites 
containing objectionable material can be reported: censorship@dia.govt.nz: 
Department of Internal Affairs Censorship and the Internet (Wellington, 2001) 
<http://www.censorship .dia. govt.nz/D IA websi te.nsf le 7 ad5e0 325 28c34c4c25666900 
76db9b/df667ab0dc96f927cc2568f7007cbldl !OpenDocument> (last accessed 20 
June 2001). Overseas experience, however, suggests that 80% of reports to such 
facilitates are about non-objectionable content. However, it does provide another 
tool in the attempt to minimise the exploitation of children and young person. 
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persons when they are "absent" from their group, technological 
capability is required to effectively defeat their evasion and security 
mechanisms. 
2 Lawfal authority to use 
However, there is no point in having the latest technology, if it 
cannot be used lawfully. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
requires that all search and seizures be conducted reasonably: 
section 21. Caselaw has held that while reasonableness and 
lawfulness are not synonymous, generally a search will be reasonable 
if it is lawfui.68 Ensuring the admissibility of any evidence seized 
through the use of investigative technologies will be dependent on 
legislation. 
Any legislative action needs to acknowledge that there are 
some technological means of evading detection that cannot presently 
be circumvented, such as 128-bit encryption. Thus, it is preferable 
that any provisions enacted should: 
(a) Require ISPs to provide encryption keys to unlock 
protected files. 69 The power to obtain actual encryption 
keys or other means of "unlocking" security protection 
protocols, such as passwords, would be a last resort. It 
68 R vJefferies [1994] 1 NZLR 290; (1993) 10 CRNZ 202 (CA) and more recently 
R v Grayson and Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR 399 (CA) , also reported as R v Grayson 
(1996) 3 HRNZ 250 (CA) , also reported as R v Taylor (1996) 14 CRNZ 426 (CA) . 
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would be preferable to legislate for a range of means to 
enable enforcement agencies to obtain the information 
really sought: the contents of protected files. 70 
Any such provision would have to be drafted carefully to 
ensure that technologically neutral wording was used to 
prevent the powers becoming obsolete. The key focus of 
the provision should be obtaining the contents of the file, 
which Police, but for the presence of the security protocol , 
would have seized and been able to examine. 
(b) Extend interception warrants to cover the computer-based 
communications of child pomographers. 71 
Police can intercept evidence of criminal activity under 
Part XIA Crimes Act 1961 and sections 14-29 Misuse of 
Drugs Amendment Act 1978. However, those provisions 
are limited to specific offences and, at present,72 are only 
applicable to audible communications. Clearly, being able 
to monitor communications between users of child 
69 Part III , Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in the United Kingdom 
requires the disclosure of encryption keys, or at least the unencrypted file. 
70 ISPs that have control of protected files could, for example, simply decrypt or 
unlock the file and provide that unprotected data directly to the Police. 
71 Presently such an intercept could only be authorised for quasi-FVPCA purposes in 
respect of the making of a publication where a child was being subjected to sadistic 
sexual violation. That would be the only means to get the sexual exploitation of a 
child with the serious violence provisions as defined by section 312A Crimes Act 
1961. 
72 The Crimes Amendment Bill (No 6), presently before the Parliament, plans to 
extend the existing intercept to computer communications. 
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pornography has advantages from a child protection 
perspective and in providing the evidence to destroy 
paedophile networks. 
(c) Provide for traffic data warrants. Traffic data warrants are 
akin to call data warrants .73 The warrants authorise 
information pertaining to a target computer's interactions 
to be gathered as the interactions occur. 
In the sense that it allows the undetected instantaneous 
observation of a computer user ' s activities, it serves as a 
means to prevent child pornographers "tipping off" their 
contacts about Police interest. It allows Police to act in 
respect to all suspected members of a child pornography 
ring when terminating an operation, without providing a 
window of opportunity for other members to destroy 
"d 74 ev1 ence. 
Each suggested extension of offline search and seizure powers 
gives rise to concerns as to the abridgement of individual rights. 
73 Sections 1 OA - 1 Os Telecommunications Act 1987. 
74 As would be the case with search warrants executed on one member alone. 
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However, as section 5 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 indicates, 
there are no absolute rights. If properly enacted, such powers will be 
lawful and reasonable restrictions on individual freedoms. 
The European Community, which maintains strict observance 
of human rights, is on the verge of concluding a Convention on 
Cyber-Crime requiring its member States to enact such investigatory 
powers. 75 In doing so, the European Community has recognised the 
need for comparable procedural provisions to ensure effective trans-
national enforcement of child pornography laws. To effectively 
contribute to the international community's fight against child 
pornography, New Zealand must enact comparable provisions. 
Incorporating such investigatory powers within the FVPCA 
both minimises the costs of investigations and lowers the risk that 
child pornographers would uncover any other means of 
· · · 76 mvest1gat1on. 
75 The enactment of traffic data and interception provision is demanded by the Draft 
Convention on Cyber-Crime (Draft 25). Article 20 requires legislative provision to 
be made for the collection of traffic data; article 21 provides for the interception of 
contents: Council of Europe Draft Convention on Cy ber-Crime (Draft 25) 
<http://convetnions.coe.int/treaty/EN/projects/cybercrime25.htm> (last accessed 14 
May 2001). 
76 Specifically, discovering the infiltration of their group by an undercover officer. 
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VI PROSECUTORIAL CHALLENGES 
A Introduction 
The issues under this head are less about illustrating weakness 
in the current legislation and more about establishing the areas of 
continuity with offline law and how that might shape prosecution of 
cases relating to cyberspace objectionable material offences. 
B Jurisdiction 
1 Deemed jurisdiction 
Section 7 Crimes Act 1961 provides an exception to the general rule 
that acts or omission outside New Zealand territory will not be within 
the jurisdiction of New Zealand Courts. 77 Section 7 amounts to a 
deeming provision. Provided that: 
(a) An act or omission forming part of the actus reus; 78 or 
(b) An event necessary for the completion of any (result) 
offence; 
occurs within New Zealand, New Zealand Courts will be deemed to 
have jurisdiction. 
77 Section 6 Crimes Act 1961. 
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2 Standard of proof required 
This raises an interesting preliminary issue. Before a Court 
can hear a charge, the issue of whether there is jurisdiction has to be 
determined. As yet, there appears to be no precedent in New Zealand 
to determine what standard of proof is required to establish 
jurisdiction. It is a preliminary issue and, generally, preliminary 
issues are determined on the balance of probabilities. The Australian 
Courts have taken that approach to the issue.79 The Canadian 
Supreme Court has also adopted that standard of proof.80 
3 "What acts will be sufficient to establish deemed jurisdiction? 
That preliminary issue aside, R v Johnston (1986) 2 CRNZ 289 
provides sufficient precedent that the use of delivery services within 
New Zealand to commit an element of an offence will be sufficient to 
provide jurisdiction. By analogy, therefore, the use of a New Zealand 
based ISP to deliver (in terms of the meaning of "distribute" under 
section 122) objectionable material will give New Zealand Courts 
jurisdiction over an offence under section 123(1)(b).81 International 
78 Tipple v Pain [1983] NZLR 257; Collector of Customs v Kozanic (1983) 1 CRNZ 
135. 
79 R v Thompson (1989) 169 CLR 1, 41 A Crim R 134; R v Weissensteiner (1992) 62 
A Crim R 96. 
80 R v Finta (1994) 112 DLR (4th) 513; 88 CCC (3d) 417 (SCC). However, that case 
went further to hold that if "jurisdictional facts" went to an element of the offence 
then they had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt as part of the prosecution case. 
That may be no more that requiring that, like any information laid in New Zealand, 
the phrase referring to the offence's location, must be proved as an element of the 
offence. If jurisdiction has been able to be established, there should be real no 
difficulties in establishing location facts beyond reasonable doubt. 
81 That is because the very act of electronic forwarding of the publication amounts 
also to an act of copying. 
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support is found for that proposition in the cases such as R v Governor 
of Brixton Prison exp Levin and R v Winfield and Lipohar.82 
4 Establishing physical control 
Of course, establishing jurisdiction is meaningless without 
achieving physical control over the perpetrator of the offence. 
Extradition is a topic in and of itself, and cannot be fully examination 
here. With respect to corporate entities , the Court can exercise control 
if it has a representative within New Zealand.83 
C Evidence 
1 Ensuring authenticity 
In any criminal proceedings, the Court must be satisfied as to 
the integrity of the evidence before a finding of guilt can be made to a 
standard of beyond reasonable doubt. A break in the chain of 
evidence can prove fatal to a prosecution. These concerns are 
heightened by the malleability of electronic data. Expert evidence 
may be presented to enable the Court to satisfy it that the evidence 
presented before it has authenticity. The processes used in the 
investigation, search, seizure, and custody processes will need to be 
82 R v Governor of Brixton Prison exp Levin [1997] QB 65: where instructions 
were sent from a computer in a foreign jurisdiction the receipt of the electronic 
instructions by a United States computer was held to be an act done in the United 
States. R v Winfield and Lipohar (1998) 70 SASR 300, as affirmed by the High 
Court of Australia in (1999) 109 A Crim R 207. There the receipt of a fax in an 
Australian jurisdiction amounted to an act done within that jurisdiction. 
83 Corporations, not being physical entities, must appear in Court by means of a 
representative: section 2 Summary Proceedings Act 1957. 
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demonstrated as being technically robust, so that the Court can reach 
the conclusion that the data has not been compromised in anyway. 
2 Ensuring comprehension 
Expert evidence is not only needed to establish evidential 
authenticity. It is also required to enable the Court to comprehend 
how the offence was committed, where technical aspects may serve to 
provide a "defence by confusion". Thus, prosecution experts must not 
only be technically qualified, but also effective communicators. 
(a) Cache alterations: an example 
One particular example demonstrates the benefits of relying on 
technical evidence where an offence may not have been obvious to a 
finder of fact not conversant in technological matters. While 
possession under section 131 is a strict liability offence, that strict 
liability relates to awareness of the contents : knowledge or reasonable 
grounds to believe. The fact of possession still needs to be proved. 
In general criminal matters, possession requires both physical 
control and a mental element. "A person cannot possess something of 
which he [or she] is unaware".84 Such logic, thus, requires some 
indication of a person's awareness that he or she has material under 
his or her control (independent of his or her awareness of the 
contents). This point is particularly germane to the operation of the 
84 Julian v Green (1989) 5 CRNZ 97, 98. 
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cache. Generally, control and intention to possess a file accessed 
through the Internet can be demonstrated because the file is 
downloaded and saved, a process which demonstrates intention to 
possess that file. 
However, files that appear in the cache are automatically 
placed there by the computer's own processes, independent of the 
user's direct control.85 A person without computer knowledge would 
not necessarily consider the cache as capable of being used as part of 
the computer's permanent memory. However, technically competent 
individuals can expand the cache's storage capacity and use it as part 
of the permanent harddrive, without leaving telltale "fingerprints" of 
knowledge and awareness by manually downloading and saving a 
particular file. 
Thus, comprehensible expert evidence provides the Court with 
the ability to understand that such alterations to the cache provide 
evidence of intention to retain files automatically loaded into the 
cache. Such evidence can rebut a defence of absence of intention to 
possess. 
85 Thus, if someone accesses an Internet site and opens a page on that site, the data 
contained within that page will be stored in the cache to maximise the efficiency of 
the computer. 
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V CONCLUSION 
The Internet has revolutionised the manner in which child 
pornography can be produced, obtained, stored, and dealt with. In 
doing so it has raised some novel issues as to how investigations and 
prosecutions under the FVPCA can be carried out to achieve the Act ' s 
initial goal in respect of section 3(2)(a): a ban on child pornography. 
In respect of the investigative issues, conventional policing has 
few responses to the advantages that the Internet supplies to users of 
child pornography. While innovative policing options are available,86 
consistency and certainty in both the investigative outcomes and the 
viability of evidence obtained are not guaranteed without legislative 
intervention. The prosecutorial issues, however, are more consistent 
with offline problems. They appear more amenable to conventional 
resolution through practical means, such as presenting detailed but 
comprehensible evidence through an appropriately qualified expert. 
Of course, the international dimension of the Internet provides 
the most challenging difficulty. While it is not New Zealand 's place 
to police the whole of the Internet, New Zealand should be active 
within the international community. Other nations should be 
86 Such as providing PERKEO software to ISPs for monitoring of content. 
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encouraged to enact consistent investigatory powers and international 
co-ordination in response to child pornography should be championed. 
While legislative action 1s a necessary step m achieving the 
objective of banishing child pornography from New Zealand, it 1s 
hopefully clear that child pornography on the Internet, as it impacts in 
New Zealand, is not just an enforcement agency responsibility. New 
Zealand Police work under a Strategic Plan, which has as its central 
philosophy "Safer Communities Together". While it has not been the 
purpose of this paper to examine issues of self-regulation, just like 
real-world communities, those who choose to participate in the online 
world, including all the stakeholders, 87 need to collaborate in making 
it a "safer community". That concept is highly relevant to the online 
community in which offending can be potentially invisible to law 
f h · · 88 en orcement aut ont1es: 
The fight against this abuse [child pornography] cannot be done alone but 
only through strong international cooperation, among governments , 
particularly law enforcement agencies , but equally important between 
States and the Internet industry, hotlines and non-governmental 
organisation. 
87 Internet users , ISPs, Parliament, enforcement agencies , both nationally and 
internationally, and voluntary watchdog organisations. 
88 "Conclusions and Recommendations of the International Conference 'Combating 
Child Pornography on the Internet '" (Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, 
Vienna, 29 September - 1 October 1999) <http://www.stop-childpornog.at/ 
pa_kind.html> (last accessed 3 May 2001) . 
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APPENDIX - LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 
I FILMS, VIDEOS, AND PUBLICATIONS 
CLASSIFICATION ACT 1993 
Section 2 Interpretation 
"Publication" means-
(a) Any film, book, sound recording, picture, newspaper, 
photograph, photographic negative, photographic plate, or 
photographic slide: 
(b) Any print or writing: 
(c) Any paper or other thing-
(i) That has printed or impressed upon it, or otherwise 
shown upon it, any word, statement, sign, or representation; or 
(ii) On which is recorded or stored any information that, by 
the use of any computer or other electronic device, is capable of 
being reproduced or shown as any word, statement, sign, or 
representation. 
"Supply" means to sell, or deliver by way of hire, or offer for sale or 
hire. 
Section 3 Meaning of "objectionable" 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a publication is objectionable if it 
describes, depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals with matters such as 
sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that the 
availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public 
good. 
(2) A publication shall be deemed to be objectionable for the 
purposes of this Act if the publication promotes or supports, or tends 
to promote or support,-
(a) The exploitation of children, or young persons, or both, 
for sexual purposes; or 
(b) The use of violence or coercion to compel any person 
to participate in, or submit to, sexual conduct; or 
(c) Sexual conduct with or upon the body of a dead person; 
or 
(d) The use of urine or excrement in association with 
degrading or dehumanising conduct or sexual conduct; or 
(e) Bestiality; or 
(f) Acts of torture or the infliction of extreme violence or 
extreme cruelty. 
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(3) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not 
any publication (other than a publication to which subsection (2) of 
this section applies) is objectionable or should be given a 
classification other than objectionable, particular weight shall be given 
to the extent and degree to which, and the manner in which, the 
publication-
(a) Describes, depicts, or otherwise deals with-
(i) Acts of torture, the infliction of serious physical 
harm, or acts of significant cruelty: 
(ii) Sexual violence or sexual coercion, or violence 
or coercion in association with sexual conduct: 
(iii) Other sexual or physical conduct of a degrading 
or dehumanising or demeaning nature: 
(iv) Sexual conduct with or by children, or young 
persons, or both: 
(v) Physical conduct in which sexual satisfaction is 
derived from inflicting or suffering cruelty or pain: 
(b) Exploits the nudity of children, or young persons, or 
both: 
(c) Degrades or dehumanises or demeans any person: 
(d) Promotes or encourages criminal acts or acts of 
terrorism: 
(e) Represents (whether directly or by implication) that 
members of any particular class of the public are inherently inferior to 
other members of the public by reason of any characteristic of 
members of that class, being a characteristic that is a prohibited 
ground of discrimination specified in section 21 (1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1993. 
(4) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not 
any publication (other than a publication to which subsection (2) of 
this section applies) is objectionable or should be given a 
classification other than objectionable, the following matters shall also 
be considered: 
(a) The dominant effect of the publication as a whole: 
(b) The impact of the medium in which the publication is 
presented: 
(c) The character of the publication, including any merit, 
value, or importance that the publication has in relation to literary, 
artistic, social, cultural, educational, scientific, or other matters: 
(d) The persons, classes of persons, or age groups of the 
persons to whom the publication is intended or is likely to be made 
available: 
(e) The purpose for which the publication is intended to be 
used: 
(f) Any other relevant circumstances relating to the 
intended or likely use of the publication. 
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Section 108 Seizure of objectionable publications 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, where an Inspector or 
a member of the Police, in the course of carrying out his or her lawful 
duties, discovers any publication that he or she believes, on reasonable 
grounds, to be objectionable, that person may, without further 
authority than this section, seize that publication. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section applies to any 
publication that is in the possession of any person in circumstances in 
which, by virtue of subsection (4) or subsection (5) of section 131 of 
this Act, the possession of that publication by that person is not an 
offence against subsection (1) of that section. 
Section 109 Search warrants 
(1) Any District Court Judge[, Justice, or Community Magistrate], 
or any Registrar (not being a member of the Police), who, on an 
application in writing made on oath, is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that there is in or on any place or 
thing-
(a) Any objectionable publication that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe is being kept for the purpose of being so dealt with 
as to constitute an offence against section 123 or section 124 or 
section 127 or section 129 of this Act; or 
(b) Any thing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
will be evidence of the commission of such an offence; or 
(c) Any thing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
is intended to be used for the purpose of committing such an 
offence-
may issue a search warrant. 
(2) An application under subsection (1) of this section may be 
made by any Inspector or any member of the Police . 
Section 122 Interpretation 
In sections 123 to 132 of this Act, unless the context otherwise 
requires, the term "distribute" means to deliver, to give, or to offer. 
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Section 123 Offences of strict liability relating to objectionable 
publications 
(1) Every person commits an offence against this Act who--
(a) Makes an objectionable publication; or 
(b) Makes a copy of an objectionable publication for the 
purposes of supply, distribution, display, or exhibition to any other 
person; or 
(c) Supplies, or has in that person's possession for the 
purposes of supply, an objectionable publication; or 
(d) For the purposes of supply to any other person, 
distributes, displays, advertises, or exhibits an objectionable 
publication; or 
(e) In expectation of payment, or otherwise for gain, or by 
way of advertisement, distributes, displays, exhibits, or otherwise 
makes available an objectionable publication to any other person; or 
(f) Delivers to any person an objectionable publication 
with intent that it should be dealt with by that person or any other 
person in such manner as to constitute an offence against this section 
or section 124 or section 127 or section 129 of this Act. 
(2) Every person who commits an offence against subsection (1) 
of this section is liable to a fine not exceeding,-
(a) In the case of an individual, $5,000: 
(b) In the case of a body corporate, $15,000. 
(3) It shall be no defence to a charge under subsection (1) of this 
section that the defendant had no knowledge or no reasonable cause to 
believe that the publication to which the charge relates was 
objectionable. 
(4) Without limiting the generality of this section, a publication 
maybe-
(a) Supplied (within the meaning of that term in section 2 
of this Act) for the purposes of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 
subsection (1) of this section; or 
(b) Made available for the purposes of paragraph (e) of 
that subsection-
not only in a physical form but also by means of the electronic 
transmission (whether by way of facsimile transmission, electronic 
mail, or other similar means of communication, other than by 
broadcasting) of the contents of the publication. 
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Section 124 Offences involving knowledge in relation to 
objectionable publications 
(1) Every person commits an offence against this Act who does 
any act mentioned in section 123(1) of this Act, knowing or having 
reasonable cause to believe that the publication is objectionable. 
(2) Every person who commits an offence against subsection (1) 
of this section is liable,-
(a) In the case of an individual, to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 1 year or to a fine not exceeding $20,000: 
(b) In the case of a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding 
$50,000. 
Section 131 Offence to possess objectionable publication 
(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5) of this section, every person 
commits an offence against this Act who, without lawful authority or 
excuse, has in that person's possession an objectionable publication. 
(2) Every person who commits an offence against subsection (1) 
of this section is liable to a fine not exceeding,-
(a) In the case of an individual, $2,000: 
(b) In the case of a body corporate, $5,000. 
(3) It shall be no defence to a charge under subsection (1) of this 
section that the defendant had no knowledge or no reasonable cause to 
believe that the publication to which the charge relates was 
objectionable. 
(4) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section makes it an offence 
for any of the following persons to be in possession of an 
objectionable publication, where such possession is for the purpose of 
and in connection with the person's official duties: 
(a) The Chief Censor: 
(b) The Deputy Chief Censor: 
(c) Any classification officer: 
(d) Any person holding office pursuant to clause 2 of the 
First Schedule to this Act: 
(e) Any member of the Board: 
(f) The labelling body or any person who is carrying out 
the functions of the labelling body: 
(g) Any Inspector: 
(h) Any member of the Police: 
(i) Any officer of the Customs: 
G) Any Judge of the High Court, or District Court Judge, 
Coroner[, Justice, or Community Magistrate]: 
(k) In relation to any publication delivered to the National 
Librarian pursuant to [section 30A of the National Library Act 1965], 
52 
the National Librarian, any other employee of the National Library 
Department, or any person employed in the Parliamentary Library: 
(I) Any other person in the service of the Crown. 
(5) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) of this section 
if the defendant proves that the defendant had possession of the 
publication to which the charge relates, in good faith,-
(a) For the purpose or with the intention of delivering it 
into the possession of a person lawfully entitled to have possession of 
it; or 
(b) For the purposes of any proceedings under this Act or 
any other enactment in relation to the publication; or 
(c) For the purpose of giving legal advice in relation to the 
publication; or 
(d) For the purposes of giving legal advice, or making 
representations, in relation to any proceedings; or 
(e) In accordance with, or for the purpose of, complying 
with any decision or order made in relation to the publication by the 
Chief Censor, the Classification Office, the Board, or any court, 
Judge[, Justice, or Community Magistrate]; or 
(f) In connection with the delivery of the publication to the 
National Librarian in accordance with [section 30A of the National 
Library Act 1965]. 
(6) Nothing in subsection (5) of this section shall prejudice any 
defence that it is open to a person charged with an offence against this 
section to raise apart from that subsection. 
(7) For the avoidance of doubt, in this section the term 
"proceedings" includes proceedings before the Classification Office. 
Section 142 Offences punishable on summary conviction 
Every offence against this Act or any regulations made under this Act 
shall be punishable on summary conviction. 
Section 143 Extending time for taking prosecutions 
Notwithstanding anything in section 14 of the Summary Proceedings 
Act 1957, any information in respect of any offence against this Act 
may be laid at any time within 2 years after the time when the matter 
of the information arose. 
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Section 144 Leave of Attorney-General to prosecute 
(1) No prosecution for an offence against any of sections 123 to 
129 of this Act or against section 131 or section 133 of this Act shall 
be commenced except with the leave of the Attorney-General. 
(2) The Attorney-General may delegate the powers of the 
Attorney-General under subsection (1) of this section to the 
Commissioner of Police in respect of offences concerning any 
particular class of publications. 
(3) The Commissioner of Police, in purporting to act under any 
delegation under subsection (2) of this section, shall, in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, be presumed to be acting within the terms of the 
delegation. 
(4) Any such delegation may be at any time revoked by the 
Attorney-General, in whole or in part, but that revocation shall not 
affect in any way anything done under the delegated authority. 
(5) No such delegation shall prevent the exercise by the Attorney-
General of any power under subsection (1) of this section. 
Section 145 Delegation of powers by Commissioner of Police 
(1) The Commissioner of Police may from time to time, by 
writing under the Commissioner's hand, either generally or 
particularly, delegate to such member or members of the Police, of a 
rank not less than Inspector, as the Commissioner thinks fit, all or any 
of the powers delegated to the Commissioner under section 144 of this 
Act. 
(2) Every person purporting to act pursuant to any delegation 
under this section shall be presumed to be acting in accordance with 
the terms of the delegation in the absence of proof to the contrary. 
(3) Subject to subsection (1) of this section, any delegation under 
this section may be made to a specified member of the Police or to 
members of the Police of a specified rank or class, or may be made to 
the holder or holders for the time being of a specified office or class of 
offices. 
(4) Every delegation under this section shall be revocable at will , 
and no such delegation shall prevent the exercise of any power by the 
Commissioner of Police. 
(5) Any such delegation shall, until revoked, continue in force 
according to its tenor, notwithstanding the fact that the Commissioner 
of Police by whom it was made may have ceased to hold office, and 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
54 
shall continue to have effect as if made by the successor in office of 
that Commissioner. 
(6) The revocation of any such delegation shall not affect in any 
way anything done under the delegated authority. 
II CRIMES ACT 1961 
Section 6 Persons not to be tried in respect of things done 
outside New Zealand 
Subject to the provisions of section 7 of this Act, no act done or 
omitted outside New Zealand is an offence, unless it is an offence by 
virtue of any provision of this Act or of any other enactment. 
Section 7 Place of Commission of Offence 
For the purpose of jurisdiction, where any act or omission forming 
part of any offence, or any event necessary to the completion of any 
offence, occurs in New Zealand, the offence shall be deemed to be 
committed in New Zealand, whether the person charged with the 
offence was in New Zealand or not at the time of the act, omission, or 
event. 
Section 312A Interpretation-
"Serious violent offence" means any offence---
(a) That is punishable by a period of imprisonment for a term of 7 
years or more; and 
(b) Where the conduct constituting the offence involves-
(i) Loss of a person's life or serious risk of loss of a 
person's life; or 
(ii) Serious injury to a person or serious risk of serious 
injury to a person; or 
(iii) Serious damage to property in circumstances 
endangering the physical safety of any person; or 
(iv) Perverting the course of justice, where the purpose of 
the conduct is to prevent, seriously hinder, or seriously 
obstruct the detection, investigation, or prosecution of any 
offence--
(A) That is punishable by a period of imprisonment for a 
term of 7 years or more; and 
(B) That involved, involves, or would involve conduct of 
the kind referred to in any of subparagraphs (i) to (iii). 
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Section 3 l 2B Application by Police for warrant to intercept 
private communications-
(1) An application may be made in accordance with this section to 
a Judge of the High Court for a warrant for any member of the Police 
to intercept a private communication by means of a listening device in 
any case where there are reasonable grounds for believing that-
[[ (a) Any member of an organised criminal enterprise is 
planning, participating in, or committing, or has planned, participated 
in, or committed, criminal offences of which at least one is a specified 
offence, as part of a continuing course of criminal conduct planned, 
organised, or undertaken by members of that enterprise; and]] 
(b) It is unlikely that the Police investigation of the case 
could be brought to a successful conclusion without the grant of such 
a warrant. 
(2) Every application under subsection (1) of this section shall be 
made by a commissioned officer of Police, in writing, and on oath, 
and shall set out the following particulars: 
(a) The facts relied upon to show that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that-
(i) There is an organised criminal enterprise; and 
(ii) Any member of that enterprise is planning, 
participating in, or committing, or has planned, 
participated in, or committed, criminal offences of 
which at least one is [[a specified offence]] as part of a 
continuing course of criminal conduct planned, 
organised, or undertaken by members of that enterprise; 
and 
(b) A description of the manner in which it is proposed to 
intercept private communications; and 
(c) The name and address, if known, of the suspect whose 
private communications there are reasonable grounds for believing 
will assist the Police investigation of the case, or, if the name and 
address of the suspect are not known, a general description of the 
premises or place in respect of which it is proposed to intercept private 
communications, being premises or a place believed to be used for any 
purpose by any member of the organised criminal enterprise; and 
(d) The period for which a warrant is requested; and 
(e) Whichever of the following is applicable: 
(i) The other investigative procedures and 
techniques that have been tried but have failed to 
facilitate the successful conclusion of the Police 
investigation of the case, and the reasons why they have 
failed in that respect; or 
(ii) The reasons why it appears that other 
investigative procedures and techniques are unlikely to 
facilitate the successful conclusion of the Police 
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investigation of the case, or are likely to be too 
dangerous to adopt in the particular case; or 
(iii) The reasons why it is considered that the case is 
so urgent that it would be impractical to carry out the 
Police investigation using only investigative procedures 
and techniques other than the interception of private 
communications. 
Section 312c Matters on which Judge must be satisfied in respect 
of applications-
(!) On an application made in accordance with section 312B of 
this Act, the Judge may grant an interception warrant if the Judge is 
satisfied that it would be in the best interests of the administration of 
justice to do so, and that-
(a) There are reasonable grounds for believing that-
(i) There is an organised criminal enterprise; and 
(ii) Any member of that organised criminal 
enterprise is planning, participating in, or committing, 
or has planned, participated in, or committed, criminal 
offences of which at least one is [[a specified offence]], 
as part of the continuing course of criminal conduct 
planned, organised, or undertaken by members of that 
enterprise; and 
(b) There are reasonable grounds for believing that 
evidence relevant to the investigation of the case will be obtained 
through the use of a listening device to intercept private 
communications; and 
(c) Whichever of the following is applicable: 
(i) Other investigative procedures and techniques 
have been tried but have failed to facilitate the 
successful conclusion of the Police investigation of the 
case; or 
(ii) Other investigative procedures and techniques 
are unlikely to facilitate the successful conclusion of 
the Police investigation of the case, or are likely to be 
too dangerous to adopt in the particular case; or 
(iii) The case is so urgent that it would be 
impractical to carry out the Police investigation using 
only investigative procedures and techniques other than 
the interception of private communications; and 
(d) The private communications to be intercepted are not 
likely to be privileged in proceedings in a Court of law by virtue of 
any of the provisions of Part III of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 
2) 1980 or of any rule of law that confers privilege on 
communications of a professional character between a barrister or 
solicitor and a client. 
[(2) Without limiting subsection (1), in determining whether or not 
to issue an interception warrant under this section, the Judge must 
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consider the extent to which the privacy of any person or persons 
would be likely to be interfered with by the interception, under the 
warrant, of private communications.] 
Section 312CA Application by Police for warrant to 
intercept private communications in relation to serious violent 
offences-
(1) An application may be made in accordance with this section to 
a Judge of the High Court for a warrant for any member of the Police 
to intercept a private communication by means of a listening device in 
any case where there are reasonable grounds for believing that,-
(a) A serious violent offence has been committed, or is 
being committed, or is about to be committed; and 
(b) Where that serious violent offence has yet to be 
committed, the use of a listening device to intercept private 
communications is likely to prevent the commission of the offence; 
and 
(c) It is unlikely that the Police investigation of the case 
could be brought to a successful conclusion or, as the case may be, the 
commission of the serious violent offence prevented, without the 
granting of such a warrant. 
(2) Every application under subsection (1) must be made by a 
commissioned officer of Police, in writing, and on oath, and must set 
out the following particulars: 
(a) The facts relied on to show that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that,-
(i) A serious violent offence has been committed, 
or is being committed, or is about to be committed; and 
(ii) Where that serious violent offence has yet to be 
committed, the use of a listening device to intercept private 
communications is likely to prevent the commission of the 
offence; and 
(b) A description of the manner in which it is proposed to 
intercept private communications; and 
(c) Either,-
(i) The name and address, if known, of the suspect 
the interception of whose private communications there are 
reasonable grounds for believing will assist the Police 
investigation of the case or, as the case may be, prevent the 
commission of a serious violent offence; or 
(ii) If the name and address of the suspect are not 
known, a general description of the premises or place in 
respect of which it is proposed to intercept private 
communications, being premises or a place believed to be used 
for any purpose by any person-
(A) Whom it is believed has committed, or 
is committing, or is about to commit, a serious violent 
offence; or 
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(B) Whom it is believed was involved, or is 
involved, or will be involved, in the commission of a 
serious violent offence; and 
(d) The period for which a warrant is requested; and 
(e) Whichever of the following is applicable: 
(i) The other investigative procedures and 
techniques that have been tried but have failed to facilitate the 
successful conclusion of the Police investigation of the case or, 
as the case may be, to provide assistance in preventing the 
commission of a serious violent offence, and the reasons why 
they have failed in that respect; or 
(ii) The reasons why it appears that other 
investigative procedures and techniques are unlikely to 
facilitate the successful conclusion of the Police investigation 
of the case or, as the case may be, prevent the commission of a 
serious violent offence, or are likely to be too dangerous to 
adopt in the particular case; or 
(iii) The reasons why it is considered that the case is 
so urgent that it would be impractical to carry out the Police 
investigation using only investigative procedures and 
techniques other than the interception of private 
communications. 
Section 312CB Matters on which Judge must be satisfied in 
respect of applications relating to serious violent offences-
(1) On an application made in accordance with section 312CA, the 
Judge may grant an interception warrant if the Judge is satisfied that it 
would be in the best interests of the administration of justice to do so, 
and that-
(a) There are reasonable grounds for believing that,-
(i) A serious violent offence has been committed, 
or is being committed, or is about to be committed; and 
(ii) Where that serious violent offence has yet to be 
committed, the use of a listening device to intercept private 
communications is likely to prevent the commission of the 
offence; and 
(b) There are reasonable grounds for believing that,-
(i) Evidence relevant to the investigation of the 
case will be obtained through the use of a listening device to 
intercept private communications; or 
(ii) Where the serious violent offence has yet to be 
committed, evidence relevant to the prevention of that offence 
will be obtained through the use of a listening device to 
intercept private communications; and 
(c) Whichever of the following is applicable: 
(i) Other investigative procedures and techniques 
have been tried but have failed to facilitate the successful 
conclusion of the Police investigation of the case or, as the 
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case may be, to provide assistance in preventing the 
commission of a serious violent offence; or 
(ii) Other investigative procedures and techniques 
are unlikely to facilitate the successful conclusion of the Police 
investigation of the case or, as the case may be, prevent the 
commission of a serious violent offence, or are likely to be too 
dangerous to adopt in the particular case; or 
(iii) The case is so urgent that it would be 
impractical to carry out the Police investigation using only 
investigative procedures and techniques other than the 
interception of private communications; and 
(d) The private communications to be intercepted are not 
likely to be privileged in proceedings in a court of law by virtue of any 
of the provisions of Part III of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 
1980 or of any rule of law that confers privilege on communications 
of a professional character between a barrister or solicitor and a client. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), in determining whether or not 
to issue an interception warrant under this section, the Judge must 
consider the extent to which the privacy of any person or persons 
would be likely to be interfered with by the interception, under the 
warrant, of private communications. 
Section 312D Contents and term of warrant-
(1) Every interception warrant shall be issued in the [[prescribed 
form]], and shall-
(a) State the offence or offences in respect of which the 
warrant is granted; and 
[[ (b) State,-
(i) In the case of a warrant granted pursuant to 
section 312C, the name and address of the suspect, if known, 
whose private communications may be intercepted, or, where 
the suspect's name and address are not known, the premises or 
place in respect of which private communications may be 
intercepted, being premises or a place believed to be used for 
any purpose by any member of the organised criminal 
enterprise; or 
(ii) In the case of a warrant granted pursuant to 
section 312CB, the name and address of the suspect, if known, 
whose private communications may be intercepted, or, where 
the suspect's name and address are not known, the premises or 
place in respect of which private communications may be 
intercepted, being premises or a place believed to be used for 
any purpose by any person-
(A) Whom it is believed has committed, or 
is committing, or is about to commit, a serious violent 
offence; or 
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(B) Whom it is believed was involved, or is 
involved, or will be involved, in the commission of a 
serious violent offence; and]] 
(c) Specify the commissioned officer of Police who (with 
any other member of the Police for the time being assisting the 
commissioned officer) may intercept the private communications; and 
(d) Where the Judge considers it necessary, contain 
express authority to enter (with force, where necessary) any aircraft, 
ship, hovercraft, carriage, vehicle, or premises for the purpose of 
placing, servicing, or retrieving a listening device; and 
(e) Contain such additional terms and conditions as the 
Judge considers advisable in the public interest. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1) of this section, where it is 
proposed to place a listening device in the residential or business 
premises of a person who is a barrister or solicitor, or a clergyman, or 
a registered medical practitioner, the Judge shall prescribe such 
conditions (if any) as the Judge considers desirable to avoid so far as 
practicable the interception of communications of a professional 
character to which the barrister or solicitor or clergyman or registered 
medical practitioner is a party. 
(3) Every interception warrant shall be valid for such 
period, not exceeding 30 days, as the Judge shall specify in the 
warrant. 
Section 312E Effect of warrant-
Every interception warrant shall have effect, according to its terms, to 
authorise the interception of private communications by means of a 
listening device. 
Section 312F Renewal of warrants-
(1) Any Judge of the High Court may from time to time grant a 
renewal of an interception warrant upon application made at any time 
before the warrant (or any current renewal of the warrant) has expired. 
(2) Every application for the renewal of an interception warrant 
shall be made in the manner provided by section 312B [[or, as the case 
requires, section 312CA]] of this Act, and shall give-
(a) The reason and period for which the renewal is 
required; and 
(b) Full particulars, together with times and dates, of any 
interceptions made or attempted under the warrant, and an indication 
of the nature of the information that has been obtained by every such 
interception. 
(3) Every such application shall be supported by such other 
information as the Judge may require. 
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(4) A renewal of an interception warrant may be granted under 
this section if the Judge is satisfied that the circumstances described in 
section 312C [[or, as the case requires, section 312CB]] of this Act 
still obtain. 
(5) Every renewal of an interception warrant shall be valid for 
such period, not exceeding 30 days, as the Judge shall specify in the 
renewal. 
(6) A renewal of an interception warrant may be granted upon an 
application made within the time prescribed by subsection (1) of this 
section notwithstanding that the warrant (or any renewal of the 
warrant) has expired before the application is determined. 
(7) Nothing in this section shall prevent a Judge from granting a 
second or subsequent renewal of an interception warrant upon an 
application duly made. 
Section 312G Emergency permits-
(1) In any case where a Judge is satisfied that circumstances exist 
that would justify the grant of an interception warrant under section 
312C [[or, as the case requires, section 312CB]] of this Act, but the 
urgency of the situation requires that the interception should begin 
before a warrant could with all practicable diligence be obtained, the 
Judge may, orally or in writing, grant an emergency permit for the 
interception of private communications in respect of particular 
premises or a particular place and in a particular manner. 
(2) Repealed 
(3) Any application for an emergency permit may be made orally, 
but otherwise every such application shall comply with the 
requirements of section 312B [[or, as the case requires, section 
312CA]] of this Act. 
(4) Where the Judge grants the application for an emergency 
permit, the Judge shall forthwith make a note in writing of the 
particulars of the application. The note shall be filed in the High Court 
Registry nearest to where the application is made, and shall, for the 
purposes of section 312H(l) of this Act, be deemed to be a document 
relating to the application for the permit. The Judge shall also make a 
note of the terms of the permit. 
(5) The provisions of section 312D of this Act, so far as they are 
applicable and with the necessary modifications, shall apply to 
emergency permits in the same manner as they apply to interception 
warrants. 
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(6) Every emergency permit shall remain valid for 48 hours from 
the time when it is given, and shall then expire. 
(7) On filing the report required by section 312P of this Act, the 
member of the Police who applied for the emergency permit (or, if 
that member is not the member filing the report, then the member who 
is filing the report) may apply to the Judge who granted the permit (or, 
if that Judge is not the Judge receiving the report, then the Judge who 
is receiving the report) for a certificate confirming the permit pursuant 
to subsection (9) of this section. 
(8) Where the Police, within the period of 48 hours during which 
the emergency permit is valid, apply for an interception warrant in 
place of the permit, the member of the Police applying for the warrant 
may also apply for a certificate confirming the permit pursuant to 
subsection (9) of this section. 
(9) The Judge to whom an application is made pursuant to 
subsection (7) or subsection (8) of this section shall issue a certificate 
confirming the permit if the Judge is satisfied, having regard to the 
requirements of section 312C [[or, as the case requires, section 
312CB]] of this Act, that if the original application for the emergency 
permit had been an application for an interception warrant, the Judge 
would have granted a warrant. 
(10) For the purposes of section 312M of this Act, an interception 
of a private communication pursuant to an emergency permit shall be 
deemed to have been made unlawfully unless the Judge to whom an 
application is made in accordance with subsection (7) or subsection 
(8) of this section issues a certificate confirming the permit pursuant 
to subsection (9) of this section. 
Section 312H Security of applications-
(1) As soon as an application for an interception warrant or for a 
renewal of an interception warrant or for an emergency permit or for a 
certificate confirming an emergency permit has been determined by 
the Judge, the Registrar shall place all documents relating to the 
application (except the warrant or renewal or permit or certificate 
itself) in a packet, seal the packet, and thereafter keep it in safe 
custody, subject to the succeeding provisions of this section. 
(2) Notwithstanding any enactment or rule of law or rules of Court 
entitling any party to any proceedings to demand the production of 
any documents, no such party shall be entitled to demand the 
production of any documents held in safe custody pursuant to 
subsection (1) of this section, except in accordance with the 
succeeding provisions of this section. 
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(3) Every such party who requires the production of any document 
held in safe custody pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall, 
except in a case to which subsection (9) or subsection (10) of this 
section applies, apply in writing to the Registrar, who shall forthwith 
notify the senior Police officer in the district. 
(4) If, within 3 days after notice is given to the senior Police 
officer in the district under subsection (3) of this section, that officer 
gives written notice to the Registrar that that officer intends to oppose 
the production of the documents, the Registrar shall refer the matter to 
a Judge. 
(5) Where the senior Police officer in the district does not give 
such written notice to the Registrar, the Registrar shall produce the 
documents to the party applying for production. 
(6) Where a matter is referred to a Judge pursuant to subsection 
(4) of this section, both the person requesting production of the 
documents and the member of the Police opposing production shall be 
given an opportunity to be heard. 
(7) If the Judge is satisfied that information in any document the 
production of which is in dispute identifies or is likely to lead to the 
identification of a person who gave information to the Police, or of 
any member of the Police whose identity was concealed for the 
purpose of any relevant investigation and has not been subsequently 
revealed, the Judge may, if the Judge believes it in the public interest 
to do so, order that the whole or any specified part of the document be 
not produced. 
(8) Subject to the provisions of subsection (7) of this section, the 
Judge shall order the production of the documents to the party 
requesting it. 
(9) Where a request for the production of any document kept in 
safe custody pursuant to subsection (1) of this section is made in the 
course of any proceedings presided over by a Judge and the request is 
opposed, the Judge shall adjudicate upon the matter as if it had been 
referred to the Judge pursuant to subsection (4) of this section. 
(1 O) Where such a request is made in the course of any other 
proceedings, the presiding judicial officer shall forthwith refer the 
matter to a Judge for adjudication . 
(11) Notwithstanding anything in this section, every Judge who is 
presiding over any proceedings in which the issue of an interception 
warrant or emergency permit is in issue shall be entitled to inspect any 
relevant document held under subsection (1) of this section. 
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3121 Destruction of irrelevant records made by use of listening 
device--
[[ (1) Every person who intercepts a private communication in 
pursuance of an interception warrant or any emergency permit must, 
as soon as practicable after it has been made, destroy any record, 
whether written or otherwise, of the information obtained by that 
interception if none of the information directly or indirectly relates 
to--
(a) The commission of a specified offence or a conspiracy 
to commit such an offence; or 
(b) The commission of a serious violent offence or a 
conspiracy to commit such an offence; or 
(c) A drug dealing offence or a prescribed cannabis 
offence (as those terms are defined in section 10 of the Misuse of 
Drugs Amendment Act 1978).]] 
(2) Every person who fails to comply with subsection (1) of this 
section commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a 
fine not exceeding $500. 
Section 312J Destruction of relevant records made by use of 
listening device--
[ [ (1) The Commissioner of Police must ensure that every record, 
whether written or otherwise, of the information obtained by the 
Police from the interception of a private communication in pursuance 
of an interception warrant or an emergency permit, being information 
that relates wholly or partly and directly or indirectly to--
(a) The commission of a specified offence or a conspiracy 
to commit such an offence; or 
(b) The commission of a serious violent offence or a 
conspiracy to commit such an offence; or 
(c) A drug dealing offence or a prescribed cannabis 
offence (as those terms are defined in section 10 of the Misuse of 
Drugs Amendment Act 1978),-
is destroyed as soon as it appears that no proceedings, or no further 
proceedings, will be taken in which the information would be likely to 
be required to be produced in evidence.]] 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall apply to--
(a) Any record of any information adduced in proceedings 
in any Court, or (in any case where the defendant pleads guilty) of any 
record of any information that, in the opinion of the Judge to whom 
the report referred to in subsection (3) of this section is made, would 
have been adduced had the matter come to trial: 
(b) Any record of any information contained in any 
transcript or written statement given to any person in accordance with 
section 312L(a) of this Act. 
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(3) Every report made to a Judge in accordance with section 312P 
of this Act shall state whether or not subsection (1) of this section has 
yet been complied with, and, if it has not, the Judge shall give such 
directions relating to the eventual destruction of the record as the 
Judge thinks necessary to ensure compliance with that subsection, 
including a requirement that the Judge be advised when the record has 
been destroyed. 
Section 312K Prohibition on disclosure of private 
communications lawfully intercepted-
(!) No person who-
(a) Intercepts or assists in the interception of a private 
communication in pursuance of an interception warrant or emergency 
permit; or 
(b) Acquires knowledge of a private communication as a 
direct or indirect result of that interception-
shall knowingly disclose the substance, meaning, or purport of that 
communication, or any part of that communication, otherwise than in 
the performance of that person's duty. 
(2) Every person who acts in contravention of subsection (1) of 
this section commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction 
to a fine not exceeding $500. 
Section 312L Notice to be given of intention to produce evidence 
of private communication-
Particulars of a private communication intercepted pursuant to an 
interception warrant or an emergency permit shall not be received in 
evidence by any Court against any person unless the party intending to 
adduce it has given to that person reasonable notice of that person's 
intention to do so, together with-
(a) A transcript of the private communication where that 
person intends to adduce it in the form of a recording, or a written 
statement setting forth the full particulars of the private 
communication where that person intends to adduce oral evidence of 
it; and 
(b) A statement of the time, place, and date of the private 
communication, and of the names and addresses of the parties to the 
communication, if they are known. 
Section 312M Inadmissibility of evidence of private 
communications unlawfully intercepted-
(!) Subject to subsections (2) to (4) of this section, where a private 
communication intercepted by means of a listening device otherwise 
than in pursuance of an interception warrant or emergency permit 
issued under this Part of this Act or of any authority conferred by or 
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under any other enactment has come to the knowledge of a person as a 
direct or indirect result of that interception or its disclosure, no 
evidence so acquired of that communication, or of its substance, 
meaning, or purport, and no other evidence obtained as a direct or 
indirect result of the interception or disclosure of that communication, 
shall be given against any person, except in proceedings relating to the 
unlawful interception of a private communication by means of a 
listening device or the unlawful disclosure of a private communication 
unlawfully intercepted in that manner. 
[[(2) Even though certain evidence is inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings by virtue of subsection (1), a Court may admit that 
evidence if the following conditions are satisfied: 
(a) The proceedings are for-
(i) A specified offence, or a conspiracy to commit 
a specified offence; or 
(ii) A serious violent offence, or a conspiracy to 
commit such an offence; and 
(b) The evidence is relevant; and 
(c) The evidence is inadmissible by virtue of subsection 
(1) merely because of a defect in form, or an irregularity in procedure, 
m-
(i) The application for or the granting of the 
interception warrant or emergency permit; or 
(ii) The manner in which the evidence was 
obtained; and 
(d) The defect in form or irregularity in procedure-
(i) Was not substantive; and 
(ii) Was not the result of bad faith.]] 
(3) Subsection (1) of this section shall not render inadmissible 
against any party to a private communication evidence of that 
communication that has, in the manner referred to in that subsection, 
come to the knowledge of the person called to give evidence, if all the 
parties to the communication consent to that person giving the 
evidence. 
(4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not render inadmissible 
evidence of a private communication by any person who intercepted 
that communication by means of a listening device with the prior 
consent of any party to the communication. 
Section 312N Inadmissibility of evidence of private 
communications lawfully intercepted-
[ [(I) Subject to subsection (2), where a private communication 
intercepted in pursuance of an interception warrant or an emergency 
permit discloses evidence relating to any offence other than-
(a) A specified offence, or a conspiracy to commit such an 
offence; or 
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(b) A serious violent offence, or a conspiracy to commit 
such an offence,-
no evidence of that communication, or of its substance, meaning, or 
purport, may be given in any Court.]] 
(2) If, in any proceedings for a drug dealing offence [[or a 
prescribed cannabis offence (as those terms are defined in section 1 O 
of the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978))),-
(a) Evidence is sought to be adduced of a private 
communication intercepted in pursuance of an interception warrant or 
an emergency permit issued under this Part of this Act; and 
(b) The Judge is satisfied, on the evidence then before the 
Judge,-
(i) That a warrant or permit could have been issued 
under Part II of the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978; 
and 
(ii) That the evidence sought to be adduced would 
have been admissible if the warrant or permit had been issued 
under that Part of that Act,-
the evidence may be admitted notwithstanding subsection (1) of this 
section. 
[[ (3) Subsection (4) applies where,-
(a) In any proceedings for a prescribed cannabis offence 
(as so defined), a Judge has to decide whether or not evidence relating 
to the offence can be admitted under subsection (2); and 
(b) In order to make that decision, the Judge has to decide 
the issue of whether or not a warrant or permit could have been issued 
under Part II of the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978 in respect 
of the prescribed cannabis offence. 
[[ (4) Where this subsection applies, the Judge must decide the issue 
referred to in subsection (3)(b) as if a warrant or permit could be 
issued under section l5B or section 19 of the Misuse of Drugs 
Amendment Act 1978 in respect of a prescribed cannabis offence 
regardless of whether or not there are reasonable grounds for 
believing-
(a) That there is an organised criminal enterprise; and 
(b) That a person who is planning, participating in, or 
committing, or who has planned, participated in, or committed, such 
an offence is a member of such an enterprise.]] 
Section 3120 Privileged evidence-
Where evidence obtained by the interception of a private 
communication would, but for the interception, have been privileged 
by virtue of-
(a) Any of the provisions of Part III of the Evidence 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1980; or 
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(b) Any rule of law that confers privilege on 
communications of a professional character between a barrister or 
solicitor and a client,-
such evidence shall remain privileged and shall not be given in any 
Court, except with the consent of the person entitled to waive that 
privilege. 
Section 312P Report to be made to Judge on use of warrant or 
permit-
(1) As soon as practicable after an interception warrant or an 
emergency permit has expired, the member of the Police who applied 
for it, or (if that member is unable to act) another commissioned 
officer of Police, shall make a written report to the Judge who granted 
the warrant or permit, or (if that Judge is unable to act) to another 
Judge, on the manner in which the power conferred by the warrant or 
permit has been exercised and the results obtained by the exercise of 
that power. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in section 312H of this Act, the 
Judge who receives a report under subsection (1) of this section shall 
be entitled to inspect any relevant document held under subsection (1) 
of that section. 
(3) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1) of this 
section, every report made for the purposes of that subsection shall 
contain the following information: 
(a) Where the listening device was placed: 
(b) The number of interceptions made by means of the 
listening device: 
(c) Whether any relevant evidence was obtained by means 
of the listening device: 
(d) Whether any relevant evidence has been, or is intended 
to be, used in any criminal proceedings: 
(e) Whether any records of a private communication 
intercepted pursuant to the warrant or permit have been destroyed in 
accordance with section 312I or section 3121 of this Act, and, if not, 
why they have not been destroyed: 
(f) Whether the listening device has been retrieved, and, if 
not, why it has not been retrieved. 
(4) On receiving a report under this section, the Judge may require 
such further information relating to the matter as the Judge thinks fit, 
and (in addition to any directions the Judge gives for the purposes of 
section 3121(3) of this Act) the Judge may give such directions as the 
Judge thinks desirable, whether relating to the retrieval of the listening 
device, or otherwise. 
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Section 312Q Commissioner of Police to give information to 
Parliament-
The Commissioner of Police must include in every annual report 
prepared by the Commissioner for the purposes of section 65 of the 
Police Act 1958 the following information in respect of the period 
under review: 
(a) The number of applications for warrants made under 
section 312B; and 
(b) The number of applications for warrants made under 
section 312CA; and 
(c) The number of applications for renewals of warrants 
made under section 312F; and 
(d) The number of applications for emergency permits 
made under section 312G; and 
(e) The number of applications referred to in each of 
paragraphs (a) to (d) that were granted, and the number that were 
refused; and 
(f) In relation to each of the types of warrant ref erred to in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) that were issued,-
(i) The number of warrants that authorised the use 
of a listening device to intercept the private communications of 
a named individual: 
(ii) The number of warrants that authorised the use 
of a listening device to intercept private communications at 
specified premises or a specified place: 
(iii) The number of warrants that authorised entry 
onto private premises; and 
(g) The number of occasions on which telephonic 
communications were intercepted under an emergency permit granted 
under section 312G; and 
(h) The average duration of warrants (including renewals); 
and 
(i) The number of prosecutions that have been instituted in 
which evidence obtained directly or indirectly from an interception 
carried out pursuant to a warrant or permit has been adduced, and the 
result of those prosecutions; and 
Q) The number of prosecutions that have been instituted 
against members of the Police (including former members of the 
Police where the prosecution relates to behaviour occurring while they 
were members of the Police) for-
(i) Offences against section 216C (prohibition on 
disclosure of private communications unlawfully intercepted): 
(ii) Offences against section 312K (prohibition on 
disclosure of private communications lawfully intercepted).] 
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III MISUSE OF DRUGS AMENDMENT ACT 1978 
Section 14 Application by Police for warrant to intercept 
private communications-
(1) An application may be made in accordance with this section to 
a Judge of the [High Court] for a warrant for any member of the 
Police to intercept a private communication by means of a listening 
device in any case where there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that-
(a) A person has committed, or is committing, or is about 
to commit, a drug dealing offence; and 
(b) It is unlikely that the Police investigation of the case 
could be brought to a successful conclusion without the grant of such 
a warrant. 
(2) Every application under subsection (1) of this section shall be 
made by a commissioned officer of Police, in writing, and on oath, 
and shall set out the following particulars: 
(a) The facts relied upon to show that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that a person has committed, or is committing, 
or is about to commit, a drug dealing offence; and 
(b) A description of the manner in which it is proposed to 
intercept private communications; and 
(c) The name and address, if known, of the suspect whose 
private communications there are reasonable grounds for believing 
will assist the Police investigation of the case, or, if the name and 
address of the suspect are not known, a general description of the 
premises or place in respect of which it is proposed to intercept private 
communications, being premises or a place believed to be used for any 
purpose by any person involved in the drug dealing offence; and 
(d) The period for which a warrant is requested; and 
(e) Whichever of the following is applicable: 
(i) The other investigative procedures and 
techniques that have been tried but have failed to facilitate the 
successful conclusion of the Police investigation of the case, 
and the reasons why they have failed in that respect; or 
(ii) The reasons why it appears that other 
investigative procedures and techniques are unlikely to 
facilitate the successful conclusion of the Police investigation 
of the case, or are likely to be too dangerous to adopt in the 
particular case; or 
(iii) The reasons why it is considered that the case is 
so urgent that it would be impractical to carry out the Police 
investigation using only investigative procedures and 
techniques other than the interception of private 
communications. 
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Section 15 :\ilatters on ·which Judge must be satisfied in respect 
of applications-
(!) On an application made to him in accordance with section 14 
of this Act. the Judge may grant an interception warrant if he is 
satisfied that it would be in the best interests of the administration of 
justice to do so, and that-
(a) There are reasonable grounds for belie\'ing that a 
person has committed, or is committing. or is about to commit a drug 
dealing offence: and 
(b) There are reasonable grounds for belie\'ing that 
evidence relevant to the investigation of the offence will be obtained 
through the use of a listening device to intercept pri\'ate 
communications; and 
(c) Whichever of the following is applicable: 
(i) Other investigative procedures and techniques 
have been tried but have failed to facilitate the successful 
conclusion of the Police investigation of the case: or 
(ii) Other investigative procedures and techniques 
are unlikely to facilitate the successful conclusion of the Police 
investigation of the case, or are likely to be too dangerous to 
adopt in the particular case; or 
(iii) The case is so urgent that it would be 
impractical to carry out the Police investigation using only 
investigative procedures and techniques other than the 
interception of private communications; and 
(d) The private communications to be intercepted are not 
likely to be privileged in proceedings in a Court of law by virtue of 
[any of the provisions of Part III of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 
2) 1980] or of any rule of law that confers privilege on 
communications of a professional character between a barrister or 
solicitor and his client. 
[ (2) Without limiting subsection (1), in determining whether or not 
to issue an interception warrant under this section, the Judge must 
consider the extent to which the privacy of any person or persons 
would be likely to be interfered with by the interception, under the 
warrant, of private communications.] 
Section ISA Application by Police for warrant to intercept 
private communications in relation to prescribed cannabis 
offences-
(1) An application may be made in accordance with this section to 
a Judge of the High Court for a warrant for any member of the Police 
to intercept a private communication by means of a listening device in 
any case where there are reasonable grounds for believing that-
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(a) Any member of an organised criminal enterprise is 
planning, participating in, or committing, or has planned, participated 
in, or committed, a prescribed cannabis offence; and 
(b) The prescribed cannabis offence involves dealing in 
cannabis on a substantial scale; and 
(c) It is unlikely that the Police investigation of the case 
could be brought to a successful conclusion without the grant of such 
a warrant. 
(2) Every application under subsection (1) must be made by a 
commissioned officer of Police, in writing, and on oath, and must set 
out the following particulars: 
(a) The facts relied upon to show that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that-
(i) There is an organised criminal enterprise; and 
(ii) Any member of that enterprise is planning, 
participating in, or committing, or has planned, participated in, 
or committed, a prescribed cannabis offence; and 
(iii) The prescribed cannabis offence involves 
dealing in cannabis on a substantial scale; and 
(b) A description of the manner in which it is proposed to 
intercept private communications; and 
(c) The name and address, if known, of the suspect whose 
private communications there are reasonable grounds for believing 
will assist the Police investigation of the case, or, if the name and 
address of the suspect are not known, a general description of the 
premises or place in respect of which it is proposed to intercept private 
communications, being premises or a place believed to be used for any 
purpose by any member of the organised criminal enterprise; and 
(d) The period for which a warrant is requested; and 
(e) Whichever of the following is applicable: 
(i) The other investigative procedures and 
techniques that have been tried but have failed to facilitate the 
successful conclusion of the Police investigation of the case, 
and the reasons why they have failed in that respect; or 
(ii) The reasons why it appears that other 
investigative procedures and techniques are unlikely to 
facilitate the successful conclusion of the Police investigation 
of the case, or are likely to be too dangerous to adopt in the 
particular case; or 
(iii) The reasons why it is considered that the case is 
so urgent that it would be impractical to carry out the Police 
investigation using only investigative procedures and 
techniques other than the interception of private 
communications. 
Section l5B Matters on which Judge must be satisfied in respect 
of applications relating to prescribed cannabis offences-
(1) On an application made in accordance with section 15A, the 
Judge may grant an interception warrant if the Judge is satisfied that it 
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would be in the best interests of the administration of justice to do so, 
and that-
(a) There are reasonable grounds for believing that-
(i) There is an organised criminal enterprise; and 
(ii) Any member of that enterprise is planning, 
participating in, or committing, or has planned, participated in, 
or committed, a prescribed cannabis offence; and 
(iii) The prescribed cannabis offence involves 
dealing in cannabis on a substantial scale; and 
(b) There are reasonable grounds for believing that 
evidence relevant to the investigation of the case will be obtained 
through the use of a listening device to intercept private 
communications; and 
(c) Whichever of the following is applicable: 
(i) Other investigative procedures and techniques 
have been tried but have failed to facilitate the successful 
conclusion of the Police investigation of the case; or 
(ii) Other investigative procedures and techniques 
are unlikely to facilitate the successful conclusion of the Police 
investigation of the case or are likely to be too dangerous to 
adopt in the particular case; or 
(iii) The case is so urgent that it would be 
impractical to carry out the Police investigation using only 
investigative procedures and techniques other than the 
interception of private communications; and 
(d) The private communications to be intercepted are not 
likely to be privileged in proceedings in a court of law by virtue of any 
of the provisions of Part III of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 
1980 or of any rule of law that confers privilege on communications 
of a professional character between a barrister or solicitor and a client. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), in determining whether or not 
to issue an interception warrant under this section, the Judge must 
consider the extent to which the privacy of any person or persons 
would be likely to be interfered with by the interception, under the 
warrant, of private communications.] 
Section 16 Contents and term of warrant-
(1) Every interception warrant shall be issued in the [prescribed 
form], and shall-
(a) State the offence in respect of which the warrant is 
granted; and 
[ (b) State,-
(i) In the case of a warrant granted under section 
15, the name and address of the suspect, if known, whose 
private communications may be intercepted, or, where the 
suspect's name and address are not known, the premises or 
place in respect of which private communications may be 
intercepted, being premises or a place believed to be used for 
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any purpose by any person involved in the drug dealing 
offence; or 
(ii) In the case of a warrant granted under section 
l5B, the name and address of the suspect, if known, whose 
private communications may be intercepted, or, where the 
suspect 's name and address are not known, the premises or 
place in respect of which private communications may be 
intercepted, being premises or a place believed to be used or 
any purpose by any member of the organised criminal 
enterprise; and] 
(c) Specify the commissioned officer of Police who (with 
any other member of the Police or .. . officer of Customs for the time 
being assisting him) may intercept the private communications ; and 
(d) Where the Judge considers it necessary, contain 
express authority to enter (with force, where necessary) any [craft,] 
carriage, vehicle, or premises, for the purpose of placing, servicing, or 
retrieving a listening device; and 
(e) Contain such additional terms and conditions as the 
Judge considers advisable in the public interest. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1) of this section, where it is 
proposed to place a listening device in the residential or business 
premises of a person who is a barrister or solicitor, or a clergyman, or 
a registered medical practitioner, the Judge shall prescribe such 
conditions (if any) as he considers desirable to avoid so far as 
practicable the interception of communications of a professional 
character to which the barrister or solicitor or clergyman or registered 
medical practitioner is a party. 
(3) Every interception warrant shall be valid for such period, not 
exceeding 30 days, as the Judge shall specify in the warrant. 
Section 17 Effect of warrant-
Every interception warrant shall have effect, according to its terms, to 
authorise the interception of private communications by means of a 
listening device. 
Section 18 Renewal of warrants-
(1) Any Judge of the [High Court] may from time to time grant a 
renewal of an interception warrant upon application made to him at 
any time before the warrant (or any current renewal thereof) has 
expired. 
(2) Every application for the renewal of an interception warrant 
shall be made in the manner provided by section 14 [or, as the case 
requires, section 15A] of this Act, and shall give-
(a) The reason and period for which the renewal is 
required; and 
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(b) Full particulars, together with times and dates, of any 
interceptions made or attempted under the warrant, and an indication 
of the nature of the information that has been obtained by every such 
interception. 
(3) Every such application shall be supported by such other 
information as the Judge may require. 
(4) A renewal of an interception warrant may be granted under 
this section if the Judge is satisfied that the circumstances described in 
section 15 [or, as the case requires, section 15B] of this Act still 
obtain. 
(5) Every renewal of an interception warrant shall be valid for 
such period, not exceeding 30 days, as the Judge shall specify in the 
renewal. 
(6) A renewal of an interception warrant may be granted upon an 
application made within the time prescribed by subsection (1) of this 
section notwithstanding that the warrant (or any renewal thereof) has 
expired before the application is determined. 
(7) Nothing in this section shall prevent a Judge from granting a 
second or subsequent renewal of an interception warrant upon an 
application duly made to him. 
Section 19 Emergency permits-
(1) In any case where a Judge is satisfied that circumstances exist 
that would justify the grant of an interception warrant under section 15 
[or, as the case requires, section 15B] of this Act, but the urgency of 
the situation requires that the interception should begin before a 
warrant could with all practicable diligence be obtained, the Judge 
may, orally or in writing, grant an emergency permit for the 
interception of private communications in respect of particular 
premises or a particular place and in a particular manner. 
(2) Repealed 
(3) Any application for an emergency permit may be made orally, 
but otherwise every such application shall comply with the 
requirements of section 14 [or, as the case requires, section 15A] of 
this Act. 
(4) Where the Judge grants the application for an emergency 
permit, he shall forthwith make a note in writing of the particulars of 
the application. The note shall be filed in the [High Court] Registry 
nearest to where the application is made, and shall, for the purposes of 
section 20(1) of this Act, be deemed to be a document relating to the 
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application for the permit. The Judge shall also make a note of the 
terms of the permit. 
(5) The provisions of section 16 of this Act, so far as they are 
applicable and with the necessary modifications, shall apply to 
emergency permits in the same manner as they apply to interception 
warrants. 
(6) Every emergency permit shall remain valid for 48 hours from 
the time when it is given, and shall then expire. 
(7) On filing the report required by section 28 of this Act, the 
member of the Police who applied for the emergency permit (or, if he 
is not the member filing the report, then that member) may apply to 
the Judge who granted the permit (or, if he is not the Judge receiving 
the report, then that Judge) for a certificate confirming the permit 
pursuant to subsection (9) of this section. 
(8) Where the Police, within the period of 48 hours during which 
the emergency permit is valid, apply for an interception warrant in 
place of the permit, the member of the Police applying for the warrant 
may also apply for a certificate confirming the permit pursuant to 
subsection (9) of this section. 
(9) The Judge to whom an application is made pursuant to 
subsection (7) or subsection (8) of this section shall issue a certificate 
confirming the permit if he is satisfied, having regard to the 
requirements of section 15 [or, as the case requires, section l5B] of 
this Act, that if the original application for the emergency permit had 
been an application for an interception warrant, he would have granted 
a warrant. 
(10) For the purposes of section 25 of this Act, an interception of a 
private communication pursuant to an emergency permit shall be 
deemed to have been made unlawfully unless the Judge to whom an 
application is made in accordance with subsection (7) or subsection 
(8) of this section issues a certificate confirming the permit pursuant 
to subsection (9) of this section. 
Section 20 Security of applications-
(1) As soon as an application for an interception warrant or for a 
renewal of an interception warrant or for an emergency permit or for a 
certificate confirming an emergency permit has been determined by 
the Judge, the Registrar shall place all documents relating to the 
application (except the warrant or renewal or permit or certificate 
itself) in a packet, seal the packet, and thereafter keep it in safe 
custody, subject to the succeeding provisions of this section. 
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(2) Notwithstanding any enactment or rule of law or rules of Court 
entitling any party to any proceedings to demand the production of 
any documents, no such party shall be entitled to demand the 
production of any documents held in safe custody pursuant to 
subsection (1) of this section, except in accordance with the 
succeeding provisions of this section. 
(3) Every such party who requires the production of any document 
held in safe custody pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall, 
except in a case to which subsection (9) or subsection (10) of this 
section applies, apply in writing to the Registrar, who shall forthwith 
notify the senior Police officer in the district. 
(4) If, within 3 days after notice is given to the senior Police 
officer in the district under subsection (3) of this section, that officer 
gives written notice to the Registrar that he intends to oppose the 
production of the documents, the Registrar shall refer the matter to a 
Judge. 
(5) Where the senior Police officer in the district does not give 
written notice to the Registrar as aforesaid, the Registrar shall produce 
the documents to the party applying for production. 
(6) Where a matter is referred to a Judge pursuant to subsection 
(4) of this section, both the person requesting production of the 
documents and the member of the Police opposing production shall be 
given an opportunity to be heard. 
(7) If the Judge is satisfied that information in any document the 
production of which is in dispute identifies or is likely to lead to the 
identification of a person who gave information to the Police, or of 
any member of the Police whose identity was concealed for the 
purpose of any relevant investigation and has not been subsequently 
revealed, he may, if he believes it in the public interest to do so, order 
that the whole or any specified part of the document be not produced. 
(8) Subject to the provisions of subsection (7) of this section, the 
judge shall order the production of the documents to the party 
requesting it. 
(9) Where a request for the production of any document kept in 
safe custody pursuant to subsection (1) of this section is made in the 
course of any proceedings presided over by a Judge and the request is 
opposed, the judge shall adjudicate upon the matter as if it had been 
referred to him pursuant to subsection (4) of this section. 
(10) Where such a request is made in the course of any other 
proceedings, the presiding judicial officer shall forthwith refer the 
matter to a Judge for adjudication as aforesaid. 
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(11) Notwithstanding anything in this section, every Judge or 
[District Court Judge] who is presiding over any proceedings in which 
the issue of an interception warrant or emergency permit is in issue 
shall be entitled to inspect any relevant document held under 
subsection (1) of this section. 
Section 21 Destruction of irrelevant records made by use of 
listening device-
[ (1) Every person who intercepts a private communication in 
pursuance of an interception warrant or any emergency permit must, 
as soon as practicable after it has been made, destroy any record, 
whether written or otherwise, of the information obtained by that 
interception if none of the information directly or indirectly relates 
to--
(a) The commission of a drug dealing offence or a 
prescribed cannabis offence; or 
(b) The commission of a specified offence or a serious 
violent offence (as those terms are defined in section 312A of the 
Crimes Act 1961), or a conspiracy to commit such an offence.] 
(2) Every person who fails to comply with subsection (1) of this 
section commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a 
fine not exceeding $500. 
Section 22 Destruction of relevant records made by use of 
listening device-
[ (1) The Commissioner of Police must ensure that every record, 
whether written or otherwise, of the information obtained by the 
Police from the interception of a private communication in pursuance 
of an interception warrant or an emergency permit, being information 
that relates wholly or partly and directly or indirectly to--
(a) The commission of a drug dealing offence or a 
prescribed cannabis offence; or 
(b) The commission of a specified offence or a serious 
violent offence (as those terms are defined in section 312A of the 
Crimes Act 1961), or a conspiracy to commit such an offence,-
is destroyed as soon as it appears that no proceedings, or no further 
proceedings, will be taken in which the information would be likely to 
be required to be produced in evidence.] 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall apply to--
(a) Any record of any information adduced in proceedings 
in any Court, or (in any case where the defendant pleads guilty) of any 
record of any information that, in the opinion of the Judge to whom 
the report referred to in subsection (3) of this section is made, would 
have been adduced had the matter come to trial: 
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(b) Any record of any information contained in any 
transcript or written statement given to any person in accordance with 
section 24(a) of this Act. 
(3) Every report made to a Judge in accordance with section 28 of 
this Act shall state whether or not subsection (1) of this section has yet 
been complied with, and, if it has not, the Judge shall give such 
directions relating to the eventual destruction of the record as he 
thinks necessary to ensure compliance with that subsection, including 
a requirement that he be advised when the record has been destroyed. 
Section 23 Prohibition on disclosure of private 
communications lawfully intercepted-
(!) No person who-
(a) Intercepts or assists in the interception of a private 
communication in pursuance of an interception warrant or emergency 
permit; or 
(b) Acquires knowledge of a private communication as a 
direct or indirect result of that interception-
shall knowingly disclose the substance, meaning, or purport of that 
communication, or any part of that communication, otherwise than in 
the performance of his duty. 
(2) Every person who acts in contravention of subsection (1) of 
this section commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction 
to a fine not exceeding $500. 
Section 24 Notice to be given of intention to produce evidence 
of private communication-
Particulars of a private communication intercepted pursuant to an 
interception warrant or an emergency permit shall not be received in 
evidence by any Court against any person unless the party intending to 
adduce it has given to that person reasonable notice of his intention to 
do so, together with-
(a) A transcript of the private communication where he 
intends to adduce it in the form of a recording, or a written statement 
setting forth the full particulars of the private communication where 
he intends to adduce oral evidence of it; and 
(b) A statement of the time, place, and date of the private 
communication, and of the names and addresses of the parties to the 
communication, if they are known. 
Section 25 Inadmissibility of evidence of private 
communications unlawfully intercepted-
(!) Subject to subsections (2) [to (4)] of this section, where a 
private communication intercepted by means of a listening device 
otherwise than in pursuance of an interception warrant or emergency 
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permit issued under this Act or of any authority conferred by or under 
any other enactment has come to the knowledge of a person as a direct 
or indirect result of that interception or its disclosure, no evidence [so 
acquired] of that communication, or of its substance, meaning, or 
purport, and no [other] evidence obtained as a direct or indirect result 
of the interception or disclosure of that communication, shall be given 
against any person, except in proceedings relating to the unlawful 
interception of a private communication by means of a listening 
device or the unlawful disclosure of a private communication 
unlawfully intercepted in that manner. 
[(2) Even though certain evidence is inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings by virtue of subsection (1), a Court may admit that 
evidence if the following conditions are satisfied: 
(a) The proceedings are for-
(i) A drug dealing offence; or 
(ii) A prescribed cannabis offence; and 
(b) The evidence is relevant; and 
(c) The evidence is inadmissible by virtue of subsection 
(1) merely because of a defect in form, or an irregularity in procedure, 
in-
(i) The application for or the granting of the 
interception warrant or emergency permit; or 
(ii) The manner in which the evidence was 
obtained; and 
(d) The defect in form or irregularity in procedure-
(i) Was not substantive; and 
(ii) Was not the result of bad faith.] 
(3) Subsection (1) of this section shall not render inadmissible 
against any party to a private communication evidence of that 
communication that has , in the manner referred to in that subsection, 
come to the knowledge of the person called to give evidence, if all the 
parties to the communication consent to that person giving the 
evidence. 
[ (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not render inadmissible 
evidence of a private communication by any person who intercepted 
that communication by means of a listening device with the prior 
consent of any party to the communication.] 
Section 26 Inadmissibility of evidence of private communications 
lawfully intercepted-
(!) Where a private communication intercepted in pursuance of an 
interception warrant or an emergency permit discloses evidence 
relating to any offence other than a drug dealing offence [or a 
prescribed cannabis offence], no evidence of that communication, or 
of its substance, meaning, or purport, shall be given in any Court. 
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[ (2) If, in any proceedings for [a specified offence or a serious 
violent offence (as those terms are defined in section 312A of the 
Crimes Act 1961)] or a conspiracy to commit such an offence,-
(a) Evidence is sought to be adduced of a private 
communication intercepted in pursuance of an interception warrant or 
an emergency permit issued under this Part of this Act; and 
(b) The Judge is satisfied, on the evidence then before the 
Judge,-
(i) That a warrant or permit could have been issued 
under Part XIA of the Crimes Act 1961; and 
(ii) That the evidence sought to be adduced would 
have been admissible if the warrant or permit had been issued 
under that Part of that Act,-
the evidence may be admitted notwithstanding subsection (1) of this 
section.] 
[(3) Subsection (4) applies where,-
(a) In any proceedings for a specified offence (as so 
defined), a Judge has to decide whether or not evidence relating to the 
offence can be admitted under subsection (2); and 
(b) In order to make that decision, the Judge has to decide 
the issue of whether or not a warrant or permit could have been issued 
under Part XIA of the Crimes Act 1961 in respect of the specified 
offence. 
[ (4) Where this subsection applies, the Judge must decide the issue 
referred to in subsection (3)(b) as if a warrant or permit could be 
issued under section 312C or section 312G of the Crimes Act 1961 in 
respect of a specified offence regardless of whether or not there are 
reasonable grounds for believing-
(a) That there is an organised criminal enterprise; and 
(b) That a person who is planning, participating in, or 
committing, or who has planned, participated in, or committed, such 
an offence is a member of such an enterprise; and 
(c) That such an offence is part of a continuing course of 
criminal conduct planned, organised, or undertaken by members of 
such an enterprise.] 
Section 27 Privileged evidence---
Where evidence obtained by the interception of a private 
communication would, but for the interception, have been privileged 
by virtue of-
[ (a) Any of the provisions of Part III of the Evidence 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1980; or] 
(b) Any rule of law that confers privilege on 
communications of a professional character between a barrister or 
solicitor and his client,-
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such evidence shall remain privileged and shall not be given in any 
Court, except with the consent of the person entitled to waive that 
privilege. 
Section 28 
permit-
Report to be made to Judge on use of warrant or 
(1) As soon as practicable after an interception warrant or an 
emergency permit has expired, the member of the Police who applied 
for it, or (if he is unable to act) another commissioned officer of 
Police, shall make a written report to the Judge who granted the 
warrant or permit, or (if he is unable to act) to another Judge, on the 
manner in which the power conferred by the warrant or permit has 
been exercised and the results obtained by the exercise of that power. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in section 20 of this Act, the Judge 
who receives a report under subsection (1) of this section shall be 
entitled to inspect any relevant document held under subsection (1) of 
that section. 
(3) Without limiting the generality of ?ubsection (1) of this 
section, every report made for the purposes of that subsection shall 
contain the following information: 
(a) Where the listening device was placed: 
(b) The number of interceptions made by means of the 
listening device: 
(c) Whether any relevant evidence was obtained by means 
of the listening device: 
(d) Whether any relevant evidence has been, or is intended 
to be, used in any criminal proceedings: 
(e) Whether any records of a private communication 
intercepted pursuant to the warrant or permit have been destroyed in 
accordance with section 21 or section 22 of this Act, and, if not, why 
they have not been destroyed: 
(f) Whether the listening device has been retrieved, and, if 
not, why it has not been retrieved. 
(4) On receiving a report under this section, the Judge may require 
such further information relating to the matter as he thinks fit, and (in 
addition to any directions he gives for the purposes of section 22(3) of 
this Act) he may give such directions as he thinks desirable, whether 
relating to the retrieval of the listening device, or otherwise. 
Section 29 Commissioner of Police to give information to 
Parliament-
The Commissioner of Police must include in every annual report 
prepared by the Commissioner for the purposes of section 65 of the 
Police Act 1958 the following information in respect of the period 
under review: 
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(a) The number of applications for warrants made under 
section 14; and 
(b) The number of applications for warrants made under 
section 15A; and 
(c) The number of applications for renewals of warrants 
made under section 18; and 
(d) The number of applications for emergency permits 
made under section 19; and 
(e) The number of applications referred to in each of 
paragraphs (a) to (d) that were granted, and the number that were 
refused; and 
(f) In relation to each of the types of warrant referred to in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) that were issued,-
(i) The number of warrants that authorised the use 
of a listening device to intercept the private communications of 
a named individual: 
(ii) The number of warrants that authorised the use 
of a listening device to intercept private communications at 
specified premises or a specified place: 
(iii) The number of warrants that authorised entry 
onto private premises; and 
(g) The number of occasions on which telephonic 
communications were intercepted under an emergency permit granted 
under section 19; and 
(h) The average duration of warrants (including renewals); 
and 
(i) The number of prosecutions that have been instituted in 
which evidence obtained directly or indirectly from an interception 
carried out pursuant to a warrant or permit has been adduced, and the 
result of those prosecutions; and 
0) The number of prosecutions that have been instituted 
against members of the Police (including former members of the 
Police where the prosecution relates to behaviour occurring while they 
were members of the Police) for offences against section 23 
(prohibition on disclosure of private communications lawfully 
intercepted).] 
IV TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 1987 
Section 1 OA Application for call data warrant-
(1) Any member of the Police or any Customs officer may apply 
to a District Court Judge for the issue of a call data warrant. 
(2) An application must be made in writing and on oath. 
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Section 1 OB Issue of call data warrant-
(!) On an application made under section lOA, a District Court 
Judge may issue a warrant under this section if he or she is satisfied 
that there is reasonable ground for believing-
(a) That an offence punishable by imprisonment has been, 
or is being, or is likely to be committed; and 
(b) That evidence relevant to the investigation of the 
offence will be obtained-
(i) By the use of a telephone analyser; or 
(ii) From call associated data provided by a 
network operator. 
(2) A District Court Judge may issue a warrant under this 
section-
(a) In respect of a person who is suspected of having 
committed, or of committing, or of being likely to commit, the offence 
to which the warrant relates; or 
(b) In respect of someone other than the suspected 
offender, in any case where obtaining call associated data in respect of 
that person may lead to the identification of the suspected offender. 
(3) A warrant issued under this section must comply with the 
requirements of section 1 OI. 
Section 1 Oc Effect of warrant-
(1) A call data warrant authorises any member of the Police or (as 
the case requires) any Customs officer to do the following things: 
(a) To connect a telephone analyser, or to have a telephone 
analyser connected, to any part of a network, or to any line, apparatus, 
or equipment connected to any part of a network, that is used, or 
(where applicable) is suspected of being used, by the person named in 
the warrant: 
(b) To monitor the telephone analyser, or to have the 
telephone analyser monitored: 
(c) To require the network operator whose network is 
subject to the warrant to supply, to a member of the Police or (as the 
case requires) a Customs officer, call associated data in respect of the 
person named in the warrant. 
(2) Where subsection (1) (c) applies, and for as long as the warrant 
remains in force, the network operator must supply the call associated 
data-
(a) At such intervals, or at such times; and 
(b) In such manner, or in such form, or both,-
as the member of the Police or (as the case requires) the Customs 
officer requires. 
85 
(3) Before requiring a network operator to supply call associated 
data under subsection (l)(c), the member of the Police or (as the case 
requires) the Customs officer must consult with the network operator 
to ensure that compliance with the terms of the requirement will not 
unreasonably interfere with the normal operation of the operator's 
network. 
(4) Except as provided in section lOD, a call data warrant does not 
authorise any person to enter any premises or place without the 
consent of the owner or occupier of those premises or that place. 
Section I OD Network operator required to assist in execution of 
warrant-
A network operator that owns or operates a network that is subject to a 
call data warrant must provide such assistance as is necessary to 
enable any person who is authorised by the warrant to connect a 
telephone analyser-
(a) To locate the part of the network to which the analyser 
is to be connected (including, where necessary, any relevant line, 
apparatus, or equipment) ; and 
(b) To connect the analyser in accordance with the 
warrant. 
Section I OE Failure to comply with call data warrant-
Every network operator commits an offence and is liable on summary 
conviction to a fine not exceeding $2,000 who,-
(a) Fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the 
requirements of section lOD; or 
(b) Having been required under a call data warrant to 
supply call associated data,-
(i) Fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply 
with that requirement (including any requirement imposed 
under section 1 OC (2)); or 
(ii) Knowingly supplies information that is false or 
misleading in purported compliance with that requirement. 
Section IOF Telephone analysers must comply with technical 
requirements-
(!) A telephone analyser must not be connected under a call data 
warrant to any part of a network unless-
(a) The analyser is approved (or is of a kind approved) for 
connection to that network by the network operator that owns or 
operates the network; and 
(b) The analyser is connected to the network in the manner 
(if any) approved by that network operator. 
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(2) A network operator may-
(a) Refuse to approve a telephone analyser or a kind of 
telephone analyser for the purposes of subsection (l)(a); or 
(b) Determine the manner in which telephone analysers are 
connected to the operator's network for the purposes of subsection 
(l)(b)-
only if it is necessary, and only to the extent necessary, to prevent 
interference with or damage to the network. 
Section 1 OG Existence of call data warrant not to be disclosed-
(1) A network operator whose network is, or has been, subject to a 
call data warrant must not disclose the existence or operation of the 
warrant to any person except-
(a) The Commissioner of Police or a member of the Police 
who is authorised by the Commissioner to receive the information; or 
(b) The Comptroller of Customs or a Customs officer who 
is authorised by the Comptroller to receive the information; or 
(c) An employee or agent of the network operator, for the 
purpose of ensuring compliance with the warrant; or 
(d) A lawyer, for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or 
representation in relation to the warrant. 
(2) A person referred to in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of 
subsection (1) to whom disclosure of the existence or operation of a 
call data warrant has been made must not disclose the existence or 
operation of the warrant except to another person of the kind ref erred 
to in that subsection, for the purpose of the performance of the first-
mentioned person's duties . 
(3) A person referred to in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) to 
whom disclosure of the existence or operation of a call data warrant 
has been made must not disclose the existence or operation of the 
warrant except to another person of the kind referred to in that 
subsection, for the purpose of ensuring that the warrant is complied 
with or obtaining legal advice or representation in relation to the 
warrant. 
(4) A person referred to in paragraph (d) of subsection (1) to 
whom disclosure of the existence or operation of a call data warrant 
has been made must not disclose the existence or operation of the 
warrant except to a person of the kind ref erred to in that subsection, 
for the purpose of giving legal advice or making representations in 
relation to the warrant. 
(5) Nothing in subsections (1) to (4) prevents the disclosure of the 
existence or operation of a call data warrant-
(a) In connection with, or in the course of, proceedings 
before a court; or 
(b) Under section lOR; or 
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(c) By the Police or the New Zealand Customs Service, 
where disclosure is made in response to a request made under the 
Official Information Act 1982 or the Privacy Act 1993. 
Section 1 OH Offences-
(1) Every person commits an offence who knowingly contravenes 
any of subsections (1) to (4) of Section lOG. 
(2) Every person who commits an offence against subsection (1) is 
liable on summary conviction,-
(a) In the case of an individual, to a fine not exceeding 
$2,000: 
(b) In the case of a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding 
$5,000. 
(3) Every person commits an offence who discloses any 
information in contravention of any of subsections (1) to (4) of section 
lOG, in any case where that person-
(a) Knows that the person is not legally authorised to 
disclose the information; and 
(b) Discloses the information either-
(i) For the purpose of obtaining, directly or 
indirectly, an advantage or a pecuniary gain for that person or 
any other person; or 
(ii) With intent to prejudice any investigation into 
the commission or possible commission of any offence. 
(4) Every person who commits an offence against subsection (3) is 
liable on summary conviction,-
(a) In the case of an individual, to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding $5,000: 
(b) In the case of a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding 
$10,000. 
Section 101 Form and content of warrant-
(1) A call data warrant must be in the prescribed form. 
(2) A call data warrant must be directed-
(a) To members of the Police generally; or 
(b) To Customs officers generally. 
(3) A call data warrant must contain the following particulars: 
(a) The offence or offences in respect of which the warrant 
is issued: 
(b) The kind of telecommunication in respect of which call 
associated data is authorised to be obtained: 
(c) The name and address of the person in respect of whom 
call associated data is authorised to be obtained: 
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(d) If known, the telephone number to which the warrant 
relates: 
(e) If that telephone number is not known, the premises or 
place in respect of which a telephone analyser may be used, being 
premises or a place used or suspected of being used, by the person to 
whom the warrant relates, for the purposes of, or for any purpose 
relating to, an offence in respect of which the warrant is issued: 
(f) The period for which the warrant is to be in force. 
Section 1 OJ Duration of warrant-
Unless renewed under section lOK, a call data warrant expires at the 
end of the period (not exceeding 30 days) specified in the warrant. 
Section 1 OK Renewal of warrant-
(1) Any member of the Police or any Customs officer may apply 
to a District Court Judge for the renewal of a call data warrant that has 
not expired. 
(2) An application for the renewal of a call data warrant must be in 
writing and on oath. 
(3) On an application made under this section, a District Court 
Judge may renew a call data warrant if he or she is satisfied that the 
circumstances specified in section 10B(l) still apply. 
(4) A call data warrant may be renewed under this section for a 
period of not more than 30 days. 
(5) The period for which a call data warrant is renewed must be 
endorsed on the warrant, and (unless renewed again) the warrant 
expires at the end of that period. 
(6) A call data warrant may be renewed 1 or more times under this 
section. 
Section 1 OL Security of applications for warrants-
(1) As soon as a District Court Judge has determined an 
application for a call data warrant or for the renewal of a call data 
warrant, all documents relating to the application (except the warrant 
itself) must be dealt with in accordance with subsection (2). 
(2) Where this section applies, the Registrar of the relevant 
District Court must-
(a) Place the documents in a packet; and 
(b) Seal the packet; and 
(c) Keep the packet in safe custody, subject to sections 
lOM to lOQ. 
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Section 1 OM Restriction on production of documents relating to 
application-
(1) Regardless of any enactment or rule of law or any rules of 
court entitling any party to any proceedings to demand the production 
of any documents, no such party is entitled to demand the production 
of any documents held in safe custody under section lOL. 
(2) Subsection (1) is subject to sections ION to lOQ. 
Section 1 ON Application for production of documents-
(1) Any party to any proceedings who requires the production of 
any document held in safe custody under section 1 OL must (except in 
a case to which section lOP applies) apply in writing to the Registrar 
who holds the document. 
(2) On receiving notification under subsection (1), the Registrar 
must, without delay, notify-
(a) The senior Police officer in the district, in any case 
where the document is or relates to an application for a call data 
warrant sought by a member of the Police: 
(b) The senior Customs officer in the district, in any case 
where the document is or relates to an application for a call data 
warrant sought by a Customs officer. 
(3) If, within 3 days after notice is given under subsection (2), the 
officer to whom the notice is given notifies the Registrar in writing 
that the officer intends to oppose the production of the document, the 
Registrar must refer the application for production to a District Court 
Judge. 
(4) Where the officer does not notify his or her opposition to the 
Registrar within the period specified in subsection (3), the Registrar 
must produce the document to the party applying for production. 
Section 100 Application referred to Judge--
(1) If, under section 10N(3), a Registrar refers an application for 
production to a District Court Judge, the application must be dealt 
with in accordance with this section. 
(2) Both the person applying for production of the document and 
the member of the Police or Customs officer opposing production 
must be given an opportunity to be heard. 
(3) If the District Court Judge is satisfied that information in any 
document whose production is sought identifies, or is likely to lead to 
the identification of,-
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(a) A person who gave information to the Police, or to the 
New Zealand Customs Service; or 
(b) Any member of the Police, or any Customs officer, 
whose identity was concealed for the purpose of any relevant 
investigation and has not been subsequently revealed,-
the Judge may, if the Judge believes it in the public interest to do so, 
order that the whole or any specified part of the document not be 
produced. 
(4) If the Judge does not make an order under subsection (3), the 
Judge must order the production of the document to the party 
requesting it. 
Section 1 OP Request for production made in course of 
proceedings-
(1) If-
(a) A request for the production of any document kept in 
safe custody under section lOL is made in the course of any 
proceedings presided over by a District Court Judge or a Judge of the 
High Court; and 
(b) The request is opposed,-
that Judge must adjudicate on the matter as if it had been referred 
under section 10N(3) to a District Court Judge, and section 100 
applies accordingly with any necessary modifications. 
(2) If-
(a) A request for the production of any document kept in 
safe custody under section lOL is made in the course of any other 
proceedings; and 
(b) The request is opposed,-
the presiding judicial officer must, without delay, refer the matter to a 
District Court Judge for adjudication under section 100. 
Section lOQ Judge entitled to inspect any relevant document-
Regardless of anything in any of sections lOL to lOP, any Judge who 
is presiding over any proceedings in which the issue of a call data 
warrant is in issue is entitled to inspect any relevant document held 
under section 1 OL. 
Section 1 OR Reports to Parliament on call data warrants-
(1) The Commissioner of Police must include in every annual 
report prepared by the Commissioner for the purposes of section 65 of 
the Police Act 1958 the following information in respect of the period 
under review: 
(a) The number of applications made by members of the 
Police for call data warrants: 
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(b) The number of applications made under section lOK by 
members of the Police for renewals of call data warrants: 
(c) The number of applications referred to in each of 
paragraphs (a) and (b) that were granted, and the number that were 
refused: 
(d) The average duration of call data warrants (including 
renewals) issued to members of the Police. 
(2) The Comptroller of Customs must include in his or her annual 
report under section 30 of the State Sector Act 1988 the following 
information in respect of the period under review: 
(a) The number of applications made by Customs officers 
for call data warrants: 
(b) The number of applications made under section lOK by 
Customs officers for renewals of call data warrants: 
(c) The number of applications referred to in each of 
paragraphs (a) and (b) that were granted, and the number that were 
refused: 
(d) The average duration of call data warrants (including 
renewals) issued to Customs officers . 
Section 1 Os Regulations-
The Governor-General may from time to time, by Order in Council , 
make regulations prescribing the form of call data warrants.] 
V NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 
Section 5 Justified limitations 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by Jaw as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
Section 14 Freedom of expression 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the 
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any 
kind in any form. 
Section 21 Unreasonable search and seizure 
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure, whether of the person, property, or correspondence or 
otherwise. 
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VI SUMMARYPROCEEDINGSACT1957 
Section 2 Interpretation 
"Representative", in relation to a corporation, means a person duly 
appointed by the corporation to represent it for the purpose of doing 
any act or thing which the representative of a corporation is by this 
Act authorised to do, but a person so appointed shall not, by virtue 
only of being so appointed, be qualified to act on behalf of the 
corporation before the Court for any other purpose: 
Section 198 Search warrants-
(1) Any [District Court Judge] or Justice [or Community 
Magistrate], or any Registrar (not being a constable), who, on an 
application in writing made on oath, is satisfied that there is 
reasonable ground for believing that there is in any building, aircraft, 
ship, carriage, vehicle, box, receptacle, premises, or place-
(a) Any thing upon or in respect of which any offence 
punishable by imprisonment has been or is suspected of having been 
committed; or 
(b) Any thing which there is reasonable ground to believe 
will be evidence as to the commission of any such offence; or 
(c) Any thing which there is reasonable ground to believe 
is intended to be used for the purpose of committing any such 
offence-
may issue a search warrant in the prescribed form. 
(2) Every search warrant shall be directed either to any constable 
by name or generally to every constable. Any search warrant may be 
executed by any constable. 
(3) Every search warrant to search any building, aircraft, ship, 
carriage, vehicle, premises, or place shall authorise any constable at 
any time or times within one month from the date thereof to enter and 
search the building, aircraft, ship, carriage, vehicle, premises, or place 
with such assistants as may be necessary, and, if necessary, to use 
force for making entry, whether by breaking open doors or otherwise; 
and shall authorise any constable to break open any box or receptacle 
therein or thereon, by force if necessary. 
(4) Every search warrant to search any box or receptacle shall 
authorise any constable to break open the box or receptacle, by force 
if necessary. 
(5) Every search warrant shall authorise any constable to seize any 
thing referred to in subsection (1) of this section. 
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(6) In any case where it seems proper to him to do so, the [District 
Court Judge], Justice, [Community Magistrate,] or Registrar may 
issue a search warrant on an application made on oath orally, but in 
that event he shall make a note in writing of the grounds of the 
application. 
(7) Every search warrant may be executed at any time by day or 
by night. 
(8) It is the duty of every one executing any search warrant to 
have it with him and to produce it if required to do so. 
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